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1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
This appeal involves the denial of two dock permit applications submitted to the Idaho 
Department of Lands (IDL) by Plaintiffs-Respondents Lake CDA Investments LLC and Chris 
Keenan ("Applicants") pursuant to the Lake Protection Act, Idaho Code 3s 58-1301 through 58- 
1312. Applicants are the successors in interest to certain lakefront property adjacent to Lake 
Coeur d'Alene ("the subject property"). On June 8, 191 1, previous owner L.B. Armstrong 
conveyed a 16-foot-wide highway right-of-way to Kootenai County that ran near the shoreline of 
the subject property. AR 47 at 6 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law); Amended AR 1, Ex. 
C (191 1 Right-of-way Deed).' The 191 1 right-of-way was replaced with a second right-of-way 
in 1925, running 50 feet wide. AR 47 at 6; Amended AR 1, Ex. D (1925 Right-of-way Deed). 
The purpose of the expansion was to accommodate relocation of the highway closer to the 
shoreline. Amended AR 16 at 107-08 (Administrative Hearing Transcript). At that point in 
time, the right-of-way did not extend to the ordinary high water mark of Lake Coeur d'Alene, 
and a portion of the subject property adjacent to the shoreline remained unencumbered by the 
right-of-way. Amended AR 16 at 187. In 1940, this would change. 
On December 18, 1940, Vera and Jack Smith (then owners of the subject property) 
conveyed a 125-foot-wide highway right-of-way to the State of Idaho. AR 47 at 6; Amended AR 
1, Ex. F (1940 Right-of-way Deed). The new highway was again realigned, running over the 
' On July 30,2007, the administrative record was filed with the district court. Citations to the administrative record 
will begin with the designation "AR", followed by the number such document was assigned in the certificate of 
administrative record. For example, the third page of the hearing officer's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
would be AR 47 at 3. On September 27,2007, an amendment to the administrative record was filed with the district 
court. Citations to the documents in the amendment will begin with the designation "Amended AR", followed by 
the number such document was assigned in the amended certificate of administrative record. For example, the third 
page of the Idaho Transportation Department's Pre-Hearing Memorandum would be Amended AR 2 at 3 .  
shoreline and through the lake itself as it passed the subject property. AR 47 at 10, 11; Amended 
AR 16 at 103-08, 185-87; Amended AR I ,  Ex. T at 4 , 5  (1943 As Built Plan and Profile Sheets); 
Amended AR 1, Ex. W (Copy of 1943 As Built Plan and Profile Sheet). This was accomplished 
through filling of the lakebed with rock material. AR 47 at 10, 11; Amended AR 16 at 137-38; 
Amended AR 1, Ex. T. Such fill remains in place today, so that the historic ordinary high water 
make of Lalce Coeur d'Alene along this portion of the lakeshore lies under the highway fill. AR 
47 at 10, 11; Amended AR 16 at 83-86, 185-87; Amended AR 10, Ex. DD (2007 Photograph 
Showing Proposed Dock Location). The highway is cunently under the jurisdiction of the 
Intervenor-Appellant Idaho Department of Transportation (ITD). 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On or about July 31, 2006, Lake CDA Investments, LLC submitted to IDL an 
encroachment permit application, requesting approval to construct a single family dock and pier 
contiguous with the shoreline of Lake Coeur d'Alene on Lot 3, Block 1 of Marina View Estates 
(part of the former Armstrong/Smith property). AR 47 at 1-2; AR 8 (Application for 
Encroachment Permit No. L-95-S-5130). On or about November 17, 2006, Chris Keenan 
submitted to IDL an encroachment permit application, requesting approval to construct a single 
family dock and pier on adjoining Lot 2, Block 1 of Marina View Estates (also part of the former 
Armstrong/Smith property). AR 47 at 2; Amended AR 5, Ex. 25 (Application for Encroachment 
Permit No. L-95-S-5 146). Because the highway and its underlying fill run over the shoreline and 
into Lake Coeur d'Alene, both of the proposed docks would necessarily encroach upon ITD's 
highway. 
Objections to the application of Lake CDA Investments, LLC were filed by ITD and by 
Thomas and Rebecca Hudson, the owners of adjacent littoral property. By letter of January 8, 
2007, ITD asserted to IDL that the Keenan application should be denied. 
By agreement among the parties, the Lake CDA Investments and Keenan applications 
were consolidated, and on March 30, 2007, IDL held a contested case hearing before Hearing 
Officer Jim Brady on the matters. On May 18, 2007, Hearing Officer Brady issued his findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, recommending denial of both encroachment permits. The hearing 
officer determined that the Applicants failed to comply with the requirements of the Rules for the 
Regulation of Beds, Waters, and Airspace Over Navigable Lakes in the State of Idaho, IDAPA 
20.03.04 ("Lake Encroachment Rules"). In particular, the hearing officer found that the 
Applicants failed to satisfy Lake Encroachment Rule 020.03, which required that the Applicants 
obtain all additional governmental approvals necessary to perfect the permit. The hearing officer 
also found that the Applicants failed to satisfy Lake Encroachment Rule 020.02, which required 
that the Applicants possess the littoral rights necessary to pursue these dock permits. 
Both of these violations were based upon the objections of ITD, which asserted that the 
proposed docks would necessarily encroach upon the highway under its jurisdiction and that it 
would not issue the highway encroachment permits required to construct and use the proposed 
docks. IDL determined that the asserted highway encroachments would occur, that highway 
encroachment permits would therefore be required, that the Applicants had not obtained any 
highway encroachment permits, and that the agreed-upon easement between Applicants' 
predecessors in interest and the State of Idaho for access across the subject shoreline supported 
ITD's asserted jurisdiction. On -May 21, 2007, the Land Board entered its Final Order 
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concurring with the hearing officer's findings. On June 7, 2007, the Applicants petitioned the 
First Judicial District Court for judicial review of the Land Board's decision pursuant to the 
Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) On March 24, 2008, the district 
court issued it Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal, reversing the Land Board's 
decision. Thc ccntral holding of the district court was that a littoral landowner's littoral rights 
are not affected by the existence of a public roadway running up to and over the landowner's 
original shoreline. 
11. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in finding that the Land Board's decision to deny 
the Plaintiffs-Respondents' proposed dock permits did not satisfy the Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act, Idaho Code 5 67-5279(3), when substantial evidence supported the Land Board's 
determinations that (i) the proposed docks would have encroached upon a state highway without 
the requisite Idaho Transportation Department permits and (ii) Plaintiffs-Respondents failed to 
establish ownership of the littoral rights required for a lake encroachment permit. 
2. Whether the Plaintiffs-Respondents, as servient estate holders, possess the right to 
construct a dock when such construction would interfere with uses authorized under the 
easement deed of the dominant estate holder, Intervener-Appellant Idaho Transportation 
Department. 
3. Whether a littoral property owner acquires a property right in submerged lands 
owned by the State of Idaho when the acquisition does not serve the purposes of the public trust 
doctrine. 
4. Whether the district court erred in awarding costs and attorneys fees to the 
Plaintiffs-Respondents. 
111. ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Where an appeal is taken from a district court judgment when it has acted in its appellate 
capacity over an administrative proceeding, this Court "reviews the agency record independently 
of the district court's decision." Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 
(2000) (citations omitted). Applicants bear the burden here of establishing that the Land Board's . 
actions violated the provisions of Idaho Code 5 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right has been 
prejudiced. See Price v. Pa~etter County Bd. of County Comrn'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429, 958 P.2d 
583, 587 (1998). Under 5 67-5279(3), the Land Board's determinations must be affirmed unless 
its findings and conclusions are "(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in 
excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not 
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an 
abuse of discretion." In conducting its review, this "Court does not substitute its judgment for 
that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented. The Court instead defers to the 
agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous." m, 134 Idaho at 357, 2 P.3d at 
742 (citations omitted). In other words, the Land Board's factual determinations "are binding on 
the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the 
determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record." Id. (citation 
omitted). If the Land Board's action is not sustained, it "shall be set aside, in whole or in part, 
and remanded for further proceedings as necessary." Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). 
B. THE 'LMOST UNUSUAL OF CIRCUMSTANCES" EXISTED WHERE THE 
PROPOSED DOCKS WOULD HAVE ENCROACHED UPON ITD'S HIGHWAY 
WITHOUT DUE PERMISSION. 
The Lake Protection Act (LPA) authorizes the Land Board to regulate encroachments on, 
in, or above the beds of Idaho's navigable lakes. The stated purpose of the LPA is found in 
Idaho Code 5 58-1301: 
The legislature of the state of Idaho hereby declares that the public health, 
interest, safety and welfare requires that all encroachments upon, in or above the 
beds or waters of navigable lakes of the state be regulated in order that the 
protection of property, navigation, fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life, 
recreation, aesthetic beauty and water quality be given due consideration and 
weighed against the navigational or economic necessity or justification for, or 
benefit to be derived from the proposed encroachment. No encroachment on, in or 
above the beds or waters of any navigable lake in the state shall hereafter be made 
unless approval therefor has been given as provided in this act. 
Noncommercial navigational permit applications are processed by IDL in accordance 
with Idaho Code 5 58-1305. Under that section, applications are to be processed with minimal 
procedural requirements and may be denied where the Land Board finds: (1) that the 
encroachment would, or may, infringe upon the riparian or littoral rights of an adjacent property 
owner; or (2) that "the most unusual of circumstances" exist warranting denial. Idaho Code § 58- 
In this case, the "most unusual of circumstances" arose when ITD intervened in the 
permit application proceedings, asserting both that ITD would not issue the highway 
encroachment permits required to construct and use the proposed docks and that ITD, and not the 
permit applicants, held the littoral rights supporting the application. Given that ITD's objections 
appeared reasonable, the Land Board's decision to deny the proposed encroachment permits was 
neither arbitrary, capricious, nor an abuse of its discretion. As such, the Land Board's decision 
should be affirmed. 
I. The Determination Of Whether The "Most Unusual of Circumstances" 
Exists Is Left To The Land Board's Discretion. 
The determination of whether the "most unusual of circumstances" exists under Idaho 
Code 5 58-1305(a) is a question of fact left to the discretion of the Land Board. In Dupont v. 
Idaho State Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 134 Idaho 618, 7 P.3d 1095 (2000), the Court found that 
Idaho Code 5 58-1305(a) provides the Land Board "the right to deny the permit if, 
discretion, the Board determines the circumstances surrounding a particular encroachment are so 
out of the ordinary as to make it inadvisable to issue the permit. Such a determination is 
necessarily fact specific and may vary from case to case." Id. at 623, 7 P.3d at 1 I00 (emphasis 
added); see also Idaho Code 5 58-1303 ("The board of land commissioners shall regulate, control 
and permit encroachments in aid of navigation or not in aid of navigation on, in or above the 
beds of waters of navigable lakes as provided herein.") (emphasis added). In Almgren v. Idaho 
Dept, of Lands, 136 Idaho 180, 30 P.3d 958 (2001), the Court found similarly that "[tlhe 
Department had the discretion to determine whether 'unusual circumstances' existed." Id. at 184, 
30 P.3d at 962 (emphasis added). 
The scope of review for exercises of discretion is whether the decision was "arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Idaho Code 5 67-5279(3)(e). This standard has been 
explained to mean: "an agency decision would be arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion 
if it were not based on those factors that the legislature thought relevant, ignored an important 
aspect of the problem, provided an explanation that ran counter to the evidence before the 
agency, or involved a clear error in judgment." Michael S. Gilmore & Dale D. Goble, The Idaho 
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Administrative Procedure Act: A Primer for the Practitioner, 30 Idaho L. Rev. 273, 365 
(199311994). Put simply, the question is whether the agency decision was reasonable. See Brett 
v. Eleventh St. Dockowner's Ass'n, Inc., 141 Idaho 517, 522-23, 112 P.3d 805, 810-1 1 (2005) 
(affirming IDL's findings, conclusions, and decision where IDL considered the applicable 
standards and reached a "reasoned decision"). 
ii. I t  Was Reasonable For The Land Board To Require Compliance With All 
ITD Highway Right-of-way Encroachment Rules Before It Issued A Permit. 
The LPA expressly authorizes the Land Board, and its instrumentality IDL; to adopt 
rules and regulations governing lake encroachments: 
The board may adopt, revise and rescind such rules and regulations and issue such 
general orders as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes and policy of this 
chapter within the limitations and standards set forth in this chapter. Rules, 
regulations and orders adopted or issued pursuant to this section may include, but 
are not limited to, minimum standards to govern projects or activities for which a 
permit or permits have been received under this chapter and regulations governing 
procedures for processing applications and issuing permits under this chapter. 
Idaho Code $5 58-1304. Pursuant to that authority, IDL adopted +e Lake Encroachment Rules, 
IDAPA 20.03.04. See Lake Encroachment Rule 001.02 ("These rules govern encroachments on, 
in, or above navigable lakes in the state of Idaho.") 
In this case, the Land Board found that the proposed lake encroachment permits would 
have violated Lake Encroachment Rules 020.03 and 020.02. This first rule states that all 
encroachments are subject to all otherwise applicable laws and regulations. It reads: "Nothing in 
these rules shall excuse a person seeking to make an encroachment from obtaining any additional 
approvals lawfully required by federal, local or other state agencies." IDAPA 20.03.04.020.03. 
Idaho Code 5 58-119 grants LDL the power "[tlo exercise, under the general control and supervision of the state 
board of land commissioners all the rights, powers and duties vested by law in the state hoard of land commissioners 
. . . ." -- See also Kootenai Envtl. Alliance. Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 622, 631, 671 P.2d 1085, 
1094 (1983) (the Land Board's functions are "to be exercised by the Department of Lands as its 'instrumentality"'). 
The Land Board found that ITD regulations required that the Applicants obtain highway 
encroachment permits where the proposed docks would have been constructed and used on 
ITD's highway. Based upon the evidence that showed that the Applicants had not obtained a 
highway encroachment permit, that Applicants had not applied for a highway encroachment 
permit, and that ITD indicated that it would not approve a highway encroachment permit, the 
Land Board's conclusion that the Applicants had not complied with the requirements of Lake 
Encroachment Rule 202.03 was both reasonable and supported by the evidence in the record. 
a. The Land Board's Finding That The Proposed Docks Would Have 
Encroached Upon The State's Highway, Thus Implicating ITD's 
Jurisdiction, Was Supported By Substantial And Competent 
Evidence. 
The preliminary issue before the Land Board was a determination of whether the 
Applicants' proposed docks would encroach upon the State's highway, thus implicating ITD's 
jurisdiction in support of its objection. The issue was not whether the proposed docks would 
encroach upon the shoreline itself, for the Applicants admit that fact. Attorney for the Applicants 
stated to the district court: "Will the dock touch the ground at some point in time? Yeah, they 
usually do because people don't put their docks in for purposes of swimming out to get their 
dock to go to their boat." Tr. p. 37, L. 2-5. Instead, the issue was whether the "shoreline" to 
which the proposed docks would be attached to was composed of artificial fill constituting and 
supporting the State's highway. In other words, would the docks be attached to the highway 
structure or to some sliver of land unaltered by man? 
The Land Board found that the "original shoreline is landward of the current shoreline," 
AR 47 at 11, and that "the navigational encroachment w[ould] be placed on the 'highway' and 
road prism." AR 47 at 11. It is unclear whether the reviewing district court agreed with these 
findings. On the one hand, the district court found that the "public highway across landowners' 
property in these appeals does not run under or into Lake Coeur d'A1ene." R. Vol. 11, p. 320.' 
On the other hand, the district court also found that "the State's placing of fill in Lake Coeur 
d'Alene at the landowner's shoreline boundary [does not] affect their littoral rights." R. Vol. 11, 
p. 325. Regardless, this Court defers to the Land Board's factual findings as to such matters as 
the location of the highway and as to the extent to which the proposed docks would have 
physically encroached upon the highway and the highway prism. See Unutia, 134 Idaho at 357, 
2 P.3d at 742. 
Despite the district court's indications 'to the contrary, there was no dispute that the 
subject shoreline has been filled in to accommodate the highway. In their reply brief before the 
district court, Applicants admitted exactly that: "There is no dispute that there was some fill 
placed watenvard of the subject property by ITD," R. Vol. 11, p. 256, and "[ITD] placed . . . fill 
between the Appellants' retained littoral property and the OHWM of the Lake." R. Vol. 11, p. 
257. Again, Applicants explicitly agreed that the proposed docks would necessarily encroach 
upon ITD's highway fill material: "Will the dock touch the ground at some point in time? Yeah, 
they usually do because people don't put their docks in for purposes of swimming out to get their 
dock to go to their boat," Tr. p. 37 L. 2-5, and "[tlhe application shows a & minimis attachment 
of the upland end of the proposed dock above elevation 2128 (the presumed OHWM of the 
Lake)." R. Vol. 11, p. 268. 
If the district court concluded that the shoreline in front of the Applicants' property had not been filled in to 
accommodate the highway, then it erred by not discussing why the Land Board's findings to the contrary were 
clearly erroneous and were without substantial and competent evidentiary support. 
The Land Board's finding that the historic shoreline in front of the subject property had 
been filled in with artificial material to accommodate ITD's highway is also supported by the 
evidence in the record. Dirk Roeller, ITD District 1 Land Surveyor, testified on behalf of ITD at 
the agency hearing in this case. Mr. Roeller is a licensed land surveyor in four states (including 
Idaho) and has been surveying for roughly 20 years. Amended AR 16 at 78-79. Mr. Roeller 
testified that his research indicated that in 1925 the Coeur d'Alene Wallace highway was 
realigned by filling the lakebed and by pushing the shoreline out in order to take the sharpness 
out of certain curves to accommodate higher travel speeds. Amended AR 16 at 107-08. 
Realignment continued in the 1940s, particularly in the area of the subject property where the 
State of Idaho acquired a new and much wider right-of-way. Exhibits L through N depict 
graphically Mr. Roeller's understanding of the history of the alignment of the highway as it 
crossed the subject properties. Amended AR 16 at 99-109. Those exhibits show the location of 
the 1940 right-of-way extending up to and beyond the then-existing shoreline. Mr. Roeller's 
discussed how the exhibits were created: 
Okay, this sheet actually brings everything together, because the original 
designers and surveyors show the location of that subdivision on this 1943 map. 
And of course we have the original subdivision that's shown in the 1914 map. 
And so I was able to overlay those, one over the other, and match up, to the best 
of my ability, the back property lines so that we could get a relationship. 
Everything on the front of the property has been modified. The back property 
lines typically don't change. And what I was after was trying to determine 
whether or not that shoreline had moved as a result of the activity that occurred 
with this highway construction over the course of time. And that's what this 
diagram was designed to depict to the-to my supervisor, at the time who was 
Scott Stokes, and to-subsequently then to the directors of the Department of 
Lands, the Department of Parks and Rec and the Department of Transportation. 
And it shows us pretty definitely how all of those pieces lie. And you can see that 
Silver Beach Park lines line up with that subdivision. And so it shows us where 
the original Coeur d'Alene Wallace automobile highway laid. And it shows us 
where the new construction was. And you can see that we have, essentially, made 
that shoreline straight from what used to [be] a pretty jagged, (inaudible) 
shoreline. 
Amended AR 16 at 104-105; see also Amended AR 1, Ex. S at 4, 5 (Calculation Sheets circa 
1943); Amended AR 1, Ex. T at 4, 7; Amended AR 1, Ex. U at 3 (Plan and Profile Sheets for 
1952 Federal Aid Project 5041 (4)); Amended AR 1, Ex. W. Based on his survey plat analysis, 
Mr. Roeller offered his expert opinion that "[iln 1943 they built the highway 75 feet waterward 
of the shoreline out into the lake." Amended AR 16 at 187. As a result, ITD's highway structure 
now constitutes the shoreline in front of the Applicants' property, and thus, the proposed docks 
in this case would necessarily attach thereto and encroach thereon 
Mr. Roeller's conclusion that the historic shoreline is now buried under ITD's highway 
was confirmed by evidence depicting the current conditions at the subject property. Exhibit DD 
is a photograph of the proposed dock location, taken on or around February 16, 2007. Amended 
AR 10, Ex. DD; Amended AR 16 at 82-86. At the contested case hearing, Mr. Roeller described 
how Exhibit DD shows that the current shoreline consists entirely of fill material deposited by 
the State as part of the highway structure: 
[MR. SCHUSTER]. As you look at this picture there's a lot of - above the lake 
and there's a slope that goes up to the lake, there's material scattered around 
there, what is that material? 
[MR. ROELLER]. All the material you'll see in this photograph is fill that was 
placed there as a result of the highway construction over the course of the history 
of the road. 
[MR. SCHUSTER]. How do you know that this material was placed here? 
[MR. ROELLER]. Well, the first significant thing is that ITD had our geologist 
review this with me and all of the rocks that are in this area have a very sharp, 
jagged edge. They haven't had years of erosion or activity. They've been 
fractured and hauled into this site, as opposed to rocks that are further out in the 
lake that are rounded and smooth and have had several thousand years of wave 
action on them. 
Amended AR 16 at 84-85; see also Amended AR 16 at 214 (Mr. Hudson asked: "My question 
is, is that all fill in this portion right here that sticks out? Is this all fill from rip wrap [sic] and 
the state?" Mr. Roeller answered: "Yes, it is. It's all fill, in fact, from where the pump house is 
all the way around in front to where the ducks are."). 
Mr. Roeller also offered testimony that the artificial fill material extended not only up to 
the current shoreline, but also beyond it and into the lake itself: 
It's interesting when you go out here in a boat at normal summer pool and look at 
the difference between where the shoreline is and follow that dark rock out in the 
water until you see the light rock. And the light rock typically is the native 
material. The dark rock is fill material. And so all that fill that used to be upon 
the hill and has been washed down into the lake. You can't see the white 
material. It's another 15 or 20 feet out into the lake and probably covered with 
five feet of water at this point. 
Amended AR 16 at 195-96, L. 23. 
In light of the Applicants' admissions as well as the evidence presented on behalf of ITD, 
including Mr. Roeller's expert testimony and analysis, it is clear that the Land Board's findings 
that the "original shoreline is landward of the current shoreline," AR 47 at 11, and that "the 
navigational encroachment w[ould] be placed on the 'highway' and road prism," AR 47 at 11, 
were not clearly erroneous, and therefore, those findings should be affirmed. 
b. Having Found That  The Proposed Docks Would Have Encroached 
Upon The State's Highway, The Land Board Correctly Concluded 
That The Docks Would Have Required Highway Encroachment 
Permits. 
Where the Land Board found that the proposed docks would have necessarily encroached 
upon ITD's highway, it was reasonable for the Board to then conclude that highway 
encroachment permits would be necessary to construct and use the docks as intended. The Board 
found: "In accordance with IDAPA 39.03.42 ITD requires encroachments onto the road prism be 
granted permits from ITD." AR 47 at 10. That finding is supported by the plain, unambiguous 
terms of IDAPA 39.03.42.200.01, which require that all highway encroachments obtain a permit: 
To help preserve the highways as constructed and provide responsible growth 
where allowed, any individual, business, or other entity planning to add, modify, 
relocate, maintain, or remove an encroachment on the State highway or use 
highway right-of-way for any purpose other than normal travel, shall obtain a 
permit to use State highway right-of-way. Encroachment permits approved by the 
Department are required for private and public approaches (driveways and 
streets), utilities and other miscellaneous encroachments. 
IDAPA 39.03.42.200.01. 
Despite all of the their arguments as to why they had a right to dock permits in this case, 
the Applicants have offered no explanation as to why they were exempt from obtaining a 
highway encroachment permits to construct these docks on ITD's highway, as required by the 
Rules Governing Highway Right-of-way Encroachments on State Rights-of-way, IDAPA 
39.03.42, ("Highway Encroachment Rules"). The district court similarly failed to identify an 
exception to the highway encroachment permit req~irernent.~ That is because there are no 
exceptions. Highway Encroachment Rule 200.01 requires that any entity planning to construct 
an encroachment on a State highway or to use the highway right-of-way for any ouruose other 
than normal travel shall obtain a oermit. Accordingly, "[nlo activities shall be allowed on State 
highway rights-of-way until an approved permit has been issued by the Department . . . ." 
Highway Encroachment Rule 200.02. Having found no exception, the Land Board acted well 
within reason when it found that a highway encroachment permit was required. 
Nowhere in the Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal does the district court acknowledge the Highway 
Encroachment Rules or discuss the Land Board's reliance thereon. 
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c. The Land Board Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When I t  Considered 
The Status Of The Requisite Highway Encroachment Approvals In 
Making Its Decision To Deny The Proposed Boat Dock Permits. 
It makes little sense for the Land Board to grant a lake encroachment permit where it 
would violate otherwise applicable laws or regulations. The Court in DuDont found just that. 
There, the Land Board revoked a noncommercial navigational lake encroachment permit upon a 
protest from the City of Coeur d'Alene, claiming that city boating ordinances and the Idaho Safe 
Boater Act would have prevented the use of the dock by a motorized boat. Considering the 
interrelationship between the Land Board's authority under the LPA and the authority of the City 
of Coeur d'Alene and the Idaho Department of Parks and Recreation to regulate swimming 
areas: the Court in Duuont found that "the fact the Board does not have the authority to regulate 
the use of the dock does not prevent the Board from considering the proposed use in its 
decision." Id. at 625, 7 P.3d at 625. The Court explained: "It makes little sense for the Board to 
grant a permit for an encroachment when the intended use of the encroachment would violate 
applicable local and state laws." Id. As a result, the Court held that "the Board did not exceed its 
statutory authority when it considered the intended use of the proposed encroachment in making 
its determination to revoke the permit based on the existence of unusual circumstances." Id. 
A similar rationale applies here. The Land Board had jurisdiction over the encroachments 
to the extent that they were to be placed below the ordinary and artificial high water mark of one 
of Idaho's navigable lakes. Idaho Code $5 58-1301-12. ITD, on the other hand, had 
jurisdiction over the encroachments to the extent that they would be constructed and used upon 
the State's highways. See e.%, Idaho Code §§ 40-310(9), 40-311(1), 40-313(2), 49-202(23). 
' The Idaho Department of Parks and Recreation maintains jurisdiction and authority over enforcement of the Idaho 
Safe Boating Act. Idaho Code $8  67-7002, -7003. 
That distinction in governing authorities, however, did not prevent the Land Board from 
considering ITD's objections in these proceedings. In fact, Lake Encroachment Rule 020.03 
contemplates just that. The rule reads: "Nothing in these rules shall excuse a person seeking to 
make an encroachment from obtaining any additional approvals lawfully required by federal, 
local or other state agencies." IDAPA 20.03.04.020.03. Read in accordance with its 
unambiguous language, the rule describes both the action of the applicant in "seelting" an 
encroachment and the obligation of that applicant in "obtaining" additional approvals within the 
same present tense, indicating that the obligation to obtain additional approvals runs 
contemporaneously with the lake encroachment permitting process. See Mason v. Donnelly 
Club, 135 Idaho 581, 586, 21 P.3d 903, 908 (2001) (finding that the "language of the rule, like 
the language of a statute, should be given its plain, obvious and rational meaning"). That being 
so, the Land Board was free to consider the status of any additional requisite approvals prior to 
issuing these lake encroachment permits. 
The decision of how to treat any additional governmental approvals is left to the 
discretion of the Land Board. As indicated in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it 
may often be the case that the Land Board simply conditions a permit upon further compliance 
with other local, state, and federal law. See AR 47 at 11 ("A standard term in all encroachment 
permits, issued by IDL, requires the permittee to obtain additional local or federal permits as 
required."). Nonetheless, the Land Board is also free to deny a permit pending final approval 
from applicable governmental agencies. Either choice is within the Board's discretion. The 
contrary conclusion would disregard the Board's discretion under Idaho Code $5 58-1305(a) and 
58-1303, as well as the Court's decision in Duoont where the Court upheld the Board's 
discretion to revoke a permit whereby its perfection would have violated state and local laws. 
134 Idaho at 625,7 P.3d at 1102. 
d. The Factual Record Supported IDL's Determination That The 
Applicants Had Not Obtained The Requisite Highway Encroachment 
Approvals. 
In this case, there was no evidence that the Applicants had obtained the highway 
encroachment permits necessary to construct and use the proposed docks. See IDAPA 39.03.42. 
There was no evidence presented that the Applicants had applied for such a permit. In fact, the 
only evidence in the record related to the status of an ITD highway encroachment permit was 
ITD's asserted disapproval against these projects. See e,v., R. Vol. I, p. 148 (January 8, 2007 
Letter from ITD to IDL). Based upon these facts alone, the Land Board's decision to deny the 
lake encroachment permits pursuant to its authority under the LPA and Lake Encroachment Rule 
020.03 was more than reasonable and should therefore be affirmed. 
e. Where Perfection Of The Lake Encroachment Permits Required 
Approval From ITD, The Applicants Failed To Show That Their 
Rights Have Been Prejudiced. 
A party challenging an agency decision must show not only that the agency decision 
erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code 5 67-5279(3), but also that a substantial right of the 
party has been prejudiced. Price, 131 Idaho at 429,958 P.2d at 587. The Applicants in this case 
can show no such prejudice, given that perfection of the lake encroachment permits-i.e., 
construction and use of the proposed docks-would have been contingent upon further ITD 
approval regardless of the Land Board's decision. ITD's Highway Encroachment Rules are clear 
and unambiguous-all entities planning to construct an encroachment on a State highway or to 
otherwise use the highway right-of-way for any purpose other than normal travel shall obtain a 
permit. IDAPA 39.03.42.200.01, 200.02. As a result, any prejudice that the Applicants' have 
suffered is a result of their failure to obtain an ITD permit, not their failure to obtain a lake 
encroachment permit. The Applicants are free to reapply at a later date, provided they obtain the 
necessary ITD approvals. Lake Encroachment Rule 020.07.j ("The applicant may reapply at 
a later date, but will be required to pay another filing fee and publication fee, if applicable."). 
iii. The Land Board's Determination That The Proposed Docks Would Require 
Highway Encroachment Permits Was Supported By Fact And Law. 
As set forth above, the Land Board asserts that it is within its discretion to deny a lake 
encroachment permit whereby the applicant has failed to demonstrate that it has obtained all 
otherwise-required governmental approvals. Here, the Land Board did not simply rely on ITD's 
assertion that an encroachment permit was necessary but it made an independent determination 
that an ITD encroachment permit was necessary. The Land Board's determination was 
reasonably supported in both fact and law. 
a. The Land Board Correctly Concluded That The Applicants' Littoral 
Rights Were Subject To ITD's Use Of The Shoreline For Highway 
Purposes. 
The Land Board's finding that the Applicants' use of the shoreline for docking purposes 
was subject to ITD's use of the same for highway purposes pursuant to the 1940 right-of-way 
deed was supported by well established principles of easement law. The C o w  in McKav v. 
Boise Project Bd. of Control, 141 Idaho 463, 111 P.3d 148 (2005), described those principles as 
follows: "The easement owner is entitled to full enjoyment of the easement. To the degree 
privileges are expressly granted, the easement owner's rights are paramount to those of the 
servient owner." Id. at 471, 11 1 P.3d at 156. In other words, "[wlhere a servient landowner takes 
the land subject to the easement, . . . he must refrain from interfering with the use of the 
easement, and the court has the authority to order removal of obstructions." Bovdstun Beach 
Ass'n v. Allen, 11 1 Idaho 370, 377, 723 P.2d 914, 921 (Ct. App. 1986) (citation omitted). 
According to this line of cases, the servient estate holder cannot interfere with the dominant 
estate holder's specified use. 
The factual record in this case supports the conclusion that the Applicants' predecessors 
in interest understood their role in this relationship. It shows that the shoreline realignment 
discussed above in Section 1II.B.ii.a was completed as intended. The Applicants state just that in 
their opening brief before the district court: "After Smith granted the County the right-of-way 
easement of 1940 (Ex. 4), improvements were put in consistent with the rights granted 
thereunder." R. Vol. I, p. 80. This understanding-that the then-existing shoreline would be 
substantially altered and that the highway would become the new shoreline-supports the logical 
conclusion that the Smiths also understood that their rights to access the shoreline would be 
accordingly altered consistent with the State's use of the same for highway purposes. The law in 
Idaho at the time of the deed was also consistent with this understand. 
The 1940 right-of-way deed must be interpreted in conjunction with Idaho's then-extant 
common law recognition of the State's exclusive dominion over its streets and highways. The 
rule in Idaho is that the law in existence at the time of contracting becomes part of the contract, 
as if the contract itself contained an express provision to that effect. See Fid. Trust Co. v. State, 
72 Idaho 137, 149, 237 P.2d 1058, 1066 (1951) ("[Ilt is axiomatic that extant law is written into 
and made a part of every written contract."); Robinson v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 150, 100 Idaho 
263, 265, 596 P.2d 436, 438 (1979) (recognizing that the Idaho rule "appears to be the law in 
almost every state, if not all"). The existing law that is read into the contract includes not only 
constitutional and statutory provisions, but also common law principles. & Witowski v. 
Roosevelt, 199 P.3d 1072, 1078 (Wyo. 2009); Progressive W. Ins. Co. v. Yolo County Super. 
Ct., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434, 449 (2005); 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts 5 371 (2004). The parties to a 
-
contract are presumed "to know and to have had in mind" those existing laws that were in 
existence at the time of contracting. Progressive W. Ins. Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 449. 
The common law as it existed at the time of the consummation of the 1940 right-of-way 
deed described the State as having very broad police powers over its roadways, as set forth in the 
Idaho Supreme Court's 1917 decision in Keyser v. City of Boise: 
[W]e are of the opinion that the sounder rule, and the rule supported by the better 
reasoned cases, is to the effect that the streets, from side to side and end to end, 
belong to the public, and are held by the municipality in trust for the use of the 
public. . . . It follows that any one obtaining a permit from the city, for the private 
use of a public street, as in this case, takes the same with notice that it is subject to 
revocation at the will of the city, and, indeed in this view, it matters not whether 
the use is made in accordance with a permit or without one, the use is merely 
permissive in either event, and revocable at any time without notice. 
30 Idaho 440,44445,  165 P. 1121, 1122 (1917). In light of that holding, the parties to the 1940 
right-of-way deed are presumed to have known that any interest that the landowners had in the 
land beneath the roadway would be subject to broad state regulation and that the removal of any 
nuisances upon the roadway could be removed at the State's discretion. 
b. The Land Board's Finding That The Construction And Use Of The 
Proposed Docks Would Have Unreasonably Interfered With ITD's 
Use Of Its Right-of-way For Highway Purposes Was Supported By 
The Record. 
The Land Board's conclusion that the proposed docks would have unreasonably 
interfered with ITD's rightful use of its highway right-of-way was supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. The Land Board found that "the navigational encroachment will be placed 
on the 'highway' and road prism and it is ITD's belief the navigational encroachments will 
potentially compromise the road prism and potentially limit their ability to maintain and repair 
that road prism . . . ." AR 47 at 11. In direct support of that conclusion, ITD's Dirk Roeller 
offered the following expert opinion: 
Q. Okay, so I then summarize, you're offering an opinion today based on 
information that you gathered from other people with more credentials 
than you, no offense intended, in the area under inquiry? And those 
individuals have expressed to you their opinion that this would interfere 
with the road prism so you are expressing that today? 
A. That's correct. 
A. [Alny time that we need to go in there and protect that shoreline we will 
have an interest in protecting the shoreline not just around the dock, but 
where the dock is as well. 
Amended AR 16 at 166-67,209. 
Mr. Roeller was voicing ITD's concern that the area in question was at risk for slope 
failures of the kind found nearby. &Amended AR 16 at 8688,139114; see also Amended AR 
1, Ex. U at 3. Mr. Roeller described the source of the problem as follows: 
Q. Is there evidence of erosion occurring along the area in question here? 
A. Oh certainly, The erosion occurs all the way along this stretch from -- 
basically from Bennett Bay over to Fernan Crick, that whole stretch, 
receives a lot of erosion issues. And primarily it's because that takes the 
brunt of the wave action that comes all the way across the lake from the 
southwest. 
Amended AR 16 at 87, L.23; see also Amended AR 1, Ex. B (2000 Coeur d'Alene Lake Slope 
Failure Documents). ITD's concerns were not unfounded. The record shows that the stretch of 
highway in question has in fact been compromised in the past. Exhibit V is a set of plans for a 
1974 emergency highway restoration project along the stretch of highway immediately adjacent 
to that which was at issue here. Amended AR 1, Ex. V (Plan and Profile Sheets for 1974 
Federal Aid Project 5041 (46)). Mr. Roeller explained: 
Q. Okay. And can you explain what was done in this project? 
A. Yeah, this one is a project where they had some shoreline damage as a 
result of the wave action of the lake. And so they set to correct that 
problem by placing concrete culverts, shoulder grading, crushed 
aggregate, and hand placed ruble wall. All of those are indicated on Sheet 
3 of 6. That's a roadway summary sheet. It shows what was done at that 
time. 
. . .  
Q. Okay. So was this work done in the area that's in dispute here? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Amended AR 16 at 143, 144. 
It is unclear the extent to which the district court reviewed the Land Board's factual 
findings regarding the scope of interference with the highway. Without elaborating, the district 
court found simply that "since IDL approved Hudson's application just before denying these 
applications, the IDL's decisions are (e) 'arbitrary, capricious, [and] an abuse of discretion' 
under Idaho Code $ 67-5279." R. Vol. 11, p. 334-35. This conclusion could be interpreted to 
indicate that the district court disagreed with the Land Board's findings that the proposed docks 
would unreasonably interfere with the highway. If that is so, the district court misapplied the 
standard of review. The fact that the Land Board approved another application in another 
situation was just one fact weighed by the Land Board in making its determination. The Land 
Board also considered the evidence presented by ITD regarding potential interference with the 
highway. That being so, a finding by the district court that the one fact identified conclusively 
outweighs the other facts in the record to the contrary would run afoul to the standard of review, 
for a reviewing court "does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of 
the evidence presented." m, 134 Idaho at 357,2 P.3d at 742 (citations omitted). 
Supported by substantial and competent evidence, the Land Board's finding that the 
proposed docks would unreasonably interfere with ITD's highway right-of-way should be 
affirmed. 
c. Based Upon Its Findings That The Applicants' Access To The 
Shoreline Was Subject To ITD's Easement Interest In The Highway 
And That  The Applicants' Proposed Docks Would Interfere With The 
State's Highway, IDL Correctly Concluded That The Applicants 
Failed To Satisfy Lake Encroachment Rule 020.02. 
Lake Encroachment Rule 020.02 provides that only three classes of persons may apply 
for a lake encroachment permit: (1) a fee owner of land immediately adjacent to a navigable 
lake; (2) a lessee of land immediately adjacent to a navigable lake; and (3) the owner of littoral 
rights.that have been granted or deeded from a fee owner of land immediately adjacent to a 
navigable lake. IDAPA 20.03.04.020.02, 010.033. Under the rule, those otherwise eligible 
parties who have "granted" away their littoral rights shall not, however, be allowed to apply. Id. 
Read as a whole, it is reasonable to conclude that those otherwise eligible parties who have 
"subordinated" away their littoral rights would also be excluded, see Mason, 135 Idaho at 586, 
21 P.3d at 908 (providing that the language of a rule should be construed in the context of the 
rule as a whole), for it makes little sense for the Land Board to grant a lake encroachment permit 
to a party who has no legal right to attach its dock to the shoreline (let alone, instali any pylons to 
support the dock), regardless of the party's adjacency to the water. See Dupont, 134 Idaho 618,7 
P.3d 1095. 
In this case, the Land Board found that the Applicants' littoral rights had been 
subordinated to ITD's use of the shoreline for highway purposes and that ITD's assertion of 
interference was reasonable. The practical effect of those facts was that the Applicants did not 
possess the requisite littoral rights to qualify to apply for a lake encroachment permit under Lake 
Encroachment Rule 020.02. AR 47 at 11. That conclusion is further supported by Lake 
Encroachment Rule 020.07.c, which requires: "If more than one (1) littoral owner exists, the 
application must bear the signature of all littoral owners, or the signature of an authorized officer 
of a designated homeowner's or property management association." IDAPA 20.03.04.020.07.c. 
A littoral owner is defined as a "fee owner of land immediately adjacent to a navigable lake, or 
his lessee, or theowner of riparian or littoral rights that have been segregated from the fee 
specifically by deed or grant." IDAPA 20.03.04.010.33. While Lake Encroachment Rule 020.33 
does not specifically include an "easement holder" under this definition, it is reasonable to 
conclude, reading the rule as a whole, that an easement holder would be treated similarly to a 
"lessee", the signature of which is duly required upon an application under Lake Encroachment 
Rule 020.07.~. 
Again, given that it makes little sense for the Land Board to grant a lake encroachment 
permit to a party whose littoral rights have been superceded, the Board's conclusion that the 
Applicants' failed to satisfy Lake Encroachment Rule 020.02 was neither arbitrary, capricious, 
nor an abuse of discretion. 
C. THE APPLICANTS, AS SERVIENT ESTATE HOLDERS, DO NOT POSSESS 
THE RIGHT TO CONSTRUCT A DOCK WHEN SUCH CONSTRUCTION 
WOULD INTERFERE WITH USES AUTHORIZED UNDER THE EASEMENT 
DEED OF THE DOMINANT ESTATE HOLDER, IDAHO TRANSPORTATION 
DEPARTMENT. 
The district court's decision in this case implies that a servient estate holder's littoral 
rights connected with its shoreline are somehow exempt from the burden of a dominant estate 
holder's affirmative easement across that same shoreline, absent an express limitation upon those 
littoral rights. It is undisputed, as discussed above, that there was a physical conflict between the 
proposed docks and the highway. See Tr. p. 37. Yet, the district court's analysis focused not on 
the potential impact of the docks on ITD's use of the same land for highway purposes,6 but 
rather, on ITD's interference with the Applicants' use of the shoreline: "ITD cannot unilaterally 
enlarge that easement or damage the landowners. An easement does not include the right to 
enlarge the use to the injury of the servient land." R. Vol. 11, p. 325-26. The effect of that 
holding is that ITD's affirmative easement over the subject shoreline did not apply to the 
Applicants' littoral rights. 
The law in Idaho regarding the scope of easements runs contrary to the district court's 
analysis. An affirmative easement is "[aln easement that forces the servient-estate owner to 
permit certain actions by the easement holder." Black's Law Dictionary 548 (8th ed. 2004). This 
Court has held that the scope of the actions that the servient estate holder is subject to is defined 
by the specific purpose of the easement, see Viebrock v. Gill, 125 Idaho 948, 952-53, 877 P.2d 
919, 923-24 (1994), whereby the dominant estate holder is entitled to unlimited reasonable use 
of its right-of-way for that purpose. See Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 271, 985 P.2d 
1127, 1133 (1999); Abbott v. Narn~a  Sch. Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 548, 808 P.2d 1289, 
1293 (1991). Therefore, the law in Idaho before this case was that the only limitation on a 
dominant estate holder's use, absent any express restrictions, was its reasonableness. Yet, the 
district court has effectively imposed a new limitation-a reservation of access for the servient 
The district court failed to discuss any of the evidence presented to the hearing officer regarding the detrimental 
effects and interference of the proposed docks upon the ITD's highway. 
estate holders to exercise their littoral rights-a limitation found nowhere on the face of the 
easement docnment. To the extent it did so, the district court has applied the wrong standard and 
its conclusions drawn therefore should not be followed. See Conley, 133 Idaho at 271, 985 P.2d 
at 1133; m, 119 Idaho at 548,808 P.2d at 1293 
D. A LITTORAL PROPERTY OWNER DOES NOT ACQUIRE A PROPERTY 
RIGHT IN SUBMERGED LANDS OWNED BY THE STATE OF IDAHO WHEN 
THE ACQUISITION DOES NOT SERVE THE PURPOSES OF THE PUBLIC 
TRUST DOCTRINE. 
The district court's most troubling holding in this case was that the Applicants' acquired 
a right to the State's public trust lands adjacent to the Applicants' property. The district court 
held: "[Als long as it was ITD in the present cases that added fill in front of the landowners' 
property, the landowners benefit from that artificial accretion." R. Vol. 11, p. 330. In support, the 
district court found that "a riparian owner acquires a right to dredge-fill land when placed there 
by a third party." Id. While the district court did not elaborate explicitly upon the nature of the 
"benefit" or the "right" referred to, the district court quoted a Florida appellate court for the 
proposition that an upland landowner acquires an ownership interest in dredge-filled land, even 
against the state: "Under the doctrine of accretion and reliction, the added land belongs to the 
riparian owner, even as against the sovereign rights of the State." Id. at 331 (quoting Florida v. 
Deo't of Natural Res,, 400 So. 2d 488, 491-92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)). Because the State, 
the Land Board, and IDL hold these lands in trust for Idaho residents, they strongly contest those 
portions of the district court's holding suggesting that anyone but the State of Idaho owns these 
submerged lands. See Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club. Inc., 105 Idaho 
622, 625, 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 (1983) (m) (the State, as trustee, has a duty to preserve the 
public rights in submerged lands). 
i. The Question Of Ownership Of The Filled Lands Was Not Properly Before 
The Land Board Or The District Court. 
The Land Board did not resolve the question of who owns the filled-in beds of Lake 
Coeur d'Alene along the subject shoreline in its May 21, 2007 order, nor could it have. It does 
not have jurisdiction over such matters. Such ownership questions "could only have been 
resolved by a quiet title action brought before a court." Rural Kootenai Org.. Inc, v. Bd. of 
Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 842,993 P.2d 596,605 (1999) (emphasis added) (county did not have 
jurisdiction to determine, in proceedings for preliminary plat approval, who owned submerged 
land within a proposed subdivision). This case was in no way a quiet title action before a court 
of competent jurisdiction. This was an administrative hearing before an agency hearing officer 
regarding an application to construct a boat dock. As such, the sole issue before the district court 
for consideration on appeal was whether the agency's decision to deny the permit was valid 
under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. To the extent that the district court held that the 
Applicants have an ownership interest, right, or benefit to the filled-in beds of Lake Coeur 
d'Alene along the subject shoreline as against the State, it went far beyond the narrow scope of 
judicial review provided by Idaho Code $ 67-5279. 
This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the issue of ownership of the filled-in 
lands was not raised by the parties. While the Applicants staunchly argued that they had a right 
to build and use the proposed docks, nowhere in the pleadings submitted to IDL or to the district 
court did the Applicants assert an ownership interest in the submerged lands that had been filled 
by ITD to construct and maintain the highway. Below, the Applicants expressly recognized the 
State's interest in those filled-in lands, arguing instead that the proposed dock permits could be 
granted independent of that interest: 
This is not a situation where we are dealing with an encroachment on the road 
prism. This application only seeks approval for an encroachment over the State 
waters. If and when it is necessary to make application to place improvements 
(such as stairs) from the edge of the right-of-way over the prism to access the 
dock, then that application will be processed pursuant to regulations vesting DOT 
with jurisdiction. 
R. Vol. I, p. 96 (Applicants' Opening Brief). It appears that the district court drew its ownership 
conclusion out of whole cloth. 
Furthermore, the fact that the issue of ownership of these filled-in lands has been drawn 
into this case only supports the Land Board's finding that the "most unusual of circumstances" 
existed. As discussed above, IDL and the Land Board should not be forced into the position of 
adjudicating complex issues of littoral property title through the lake encroachment permitting 
process. Where legitimate issues exist regarding the ownership of littoral property, IDL and the 
Land Board retain the discretion to invoke the "most unusual of circumstances" criterion to deny 
the permits pending resolution of the title dispute by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
ii. A Littoral Owner Does Not Obtain Title To Formerly Submerged Lands 
Where The Change In Boundaries Is Due To Permissive Artificial Avulsion. 
This Court should simply vacate those portions of the district court's holding addressing 
title to those submerged lands lying under the highway fill. Should, however, this Court reach 
the merits, it is clear that the district court's holding was in error, for it was based on the 
erroneous premise that artificial fill is akin to a natural accretion. 
This Court in Smith v. Long, 73 Idaho 309,251 P.2d 206 (1952), recognized the common 
law rule that a littoral owner gains title to natural accretions that accumulate along a waterward 
property boundary. The Court described the rule of accretions as follows: "Accretion is the 
process of gradual addition of solid material, called alluvion, so as to extend the shore line, 
and the riparian owner's title extends over and covers the land thus accreted." Id. at 31 1, 251 
P.2d at 207. In that case, the Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the claimants had failed 
to show that any such accretions had occurred, and as a result, the Court held that the claimants 
had no right to the disputed land. Id. at 313,251 P.2d at 209. 
An avulsion has quite the opposite effect on property boundaries. An avulsion "is a 
sudden and perceptible loss or addition to land by the action of water, or a sudden change in the 
bed or course of a stream." Nesbitt v. Wolfkiel, I00 Idaho 396,398 n.1, 598 P.2d 1046, 1048 n.1 
(1979). In contrast with accreted lands, title to avulsive lands remains with the original owner. 
Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254,256 n.l ,668 P.2d 130, 132 n.1 (Ct. App. 1983); see also Nesbitt 
v. Wolfkiel, 100 Idaho 396, 398, 598 P.2d 1046, 1048 (1979) (acknowledging "the generally 
accepted rule that the owner of riparian land acquires title to all additions to his land caused by 
accretion . . . , unless the change takes place suddenly bv avulsion") (emphasis added); Harper v. 
Holston, 119 Wash. 436, 442, 205 P. 1062, 1064 (1922) ("sudden and rapid change" in water 
boundaries "is termed in law an avulsion. and differs from an accretion in that the one is violent 
and visible, while the other is gradual, and perceptible only after a lapse of time.") (cited in 
support in Smith v. Long, 73 Idaho 309,251 P.2d 206 (1952)). 
The changes in the subject shoreline in this ease were clearly a sudden and avulsive 
event. In the early 1940s, the State filled in the shoreline adjacent to the Applicants' property in 
order to realign the existing highway. The evidence in the record indicates that the shoreline was 
filled in approximately 75 feet waterward of the original shoreline. See above Section 1II.B.ii.a. 
Where such fill was deposited directly by the State as part of its highway construction project, 
there can be no dispute that the change in the shoreline was anything less than "sudden and 
perceptible," and it certainly was not "gradual" in any sense. That being so, under the common 
law rule of avulsion, the State continues to own the lands under the highway fill up to the 
statehood ordinary high water mark. 
The district court found otherwise. It concluded that a littoral owner gained the benefit of 
any additions created by the actions of parties other than the littoral landowner itself. The 
district court disregarded, however, not only the distinction between avulsion and accretion but 
also this Court's decision in Idaho Forest Indus.. Inc. v. Havden Lake Watershed Improvement 
Dist 112 Idaho 512, 516, 733 P.2d 733, 737 (1987) (IFI), which held that any human-caused 
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filling or draining of submerged lands, whether sudden or gradual, cannot divest the state of its 
sovereign title to submerged lands. In that case, the State was joined in a quiet title action, which 
sought to adjudicate the property rights to approximately 30 acres of land that in the past had 
been periodically flooded by Hayden Lake. In 1910, a dike was constructed across the easterly 
portion of the property, preventing the periodic flooding. Idaho Forest Industries argued that 
even if that property had been trust property at the time of statehood, the property lost its trust 
status when it was no longer covered by navigable water. Id. at 517,733 P.2d at 738. The Court 
remanded the case, finding that material issues of fact existed, including a determination of the 
location of the ordinary high water mark of the lake as it existed at the time of statehood. 
Nonetheless, the Court, in its majority decision, indicated that manmade alterations to navigable 
bodies of water do not divest the submerged lands of their public trust status: 
While those equitable principles in certain circumstances may no longer apply to 
public trust property which has lost its navigable status naturally, . . . it may well 
be that a loss of navigability resulting from a manmade dike or diversion may not, 
for equitable reasons, eliminate or destroy the public trust status of land which 
was once subject to that public trust. 
Id. at 517, 733 P.2d at 738. The three-justice concurrence written by Justice Huntely took a 
-
firmer position, finding explicitly that the State's trust obligations survive the artificial filling of 
submerged lands: 
[Flilled or otherwise drained trust land must remain impressed with the public 
trust and not subject to adverse possession. . . . [I] The state may convey public 
trust lands only where the conveyance serves public trust interests. This Court has 
stressed that the state must carefully weigh competing trust interests prior to 
alienation. The conveyance generally remains subject to the public trust even after 
title has passed. See Kootenai Environmental Alliance, supra. Adverse possession 
would defeat all of these public interest protections. 
Id. at 521, 733 P.2d at 742 (Huntley, Donaldson, & Bristline, JJ., concurring); see also 
-
Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Gilich, 609 So. 2d 367, 374 (Miss. 1992) ("Suffice it to 
say that once the state possesses public trust lands it is deemed to possess such property 
forever."). 
Applying the @'J analysis to the facts in this case, there can be no argument that the State 
continues to own the submerged lands under the highway fill. The State placed fill upon its 
submerged lands for an indisputably public purpose, all with the express consent of the upland 
landowner. To hold otherwise would disregard the concurring opinion in @'J as well as the 
State's trust obligations to protect the submerged lands for public purposes 
Moreover, even if the Court were to assume, for purposes of argument, that the highway 
fill constituted accretion rather than avulsion, and that littoral owners can gain title to artificial 
accretions caused by others, the district court's decision must still be overturned, for it failed to 
apply the exception to the common law rules of accretion and avulsion prohibiting a littoral 
landowner from gaining title to lands artificially created by, or with the consent of, the littoral 
landowner. 
The first case cited by the district court in support of its conclusion that "a riparian owner 
acquires a right to dredge-fill land when placed there by a third party," R. Vol. 11, p. 330, makes 
this very point. In State v. Gill, 66 So. 2d 141 (Ala. 1953), the Alabama Supreme Court sets 
forth the principle that: "Unless restricted by statute the right to alluvion does not depend upon 
whether the additions to the soil resulted from natural or artificial causes, and the riparian owner 
is entitled to accretions when created by artificial conditions created by third persons in which he 
has no part." Id. at 146 (emphasis added). It is this last exception that the district court failed to 
apply. Here, the Applicants' predecessors in interest expressly consented to having their 
shoreline filled in order to accommodate the highway. That being the case, they played an 
affirmative part in the creation of those lands, and therefore, they do not gain the benefit thereof 
under the reasoning of Gill. See also Lakeside Boating and Bathing Inc. v. State, 344 N.W.2d 
217, 220 (Iowa 1984) ("A riparian owner cannot acquire accretions caused by artificial means 
under the riparian owner's control."); State ex rel. State Lands Cornrn'n v. Super. Ct., 900 P.2d 
648, 650 (Cal. 1995) ("The general California rule is easy to state. If the accretion was natural, 
the private landowners own it; if it was artificial, the state owns it.''); Mississipui State Highway 
Comrn'n, 609 So. 2d at 374-75 (littoral landowners do not gain title to artificial accretions as 
against the State). The contrary holding would allow the Applicants to accomplish through an 
intermediary what they could not otherwise accomplish on their own-i.e., secure title to 
submerged lands by the simple expedient of placing fill on such lands. &g Lakeside Boating 
and Bathing Inc., 344 NW.2d at 220; Hilton Head Plantation Prop. Owners' Ass'n. Inc. v. 
Donald, 651 S.E.2d 614 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007); 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters 5 96 (2004) ("Under 
the common law, a littoral owner cannot extend its own property into water by landfilling or 
purposely causing accretion."). 
iii. Applicants' Right O r  Interest In  The State's Submerged Lands Would 
Violate The Public Trust Doctrine. 
Finally, the district court's implicit holding that artificial fill placed on submerged lands 
by state agencies divests the public of ownership of the underlying submerged lands failed to 
recognize the strict limitations placed on disposal of submerged lands by the Public Trust 
Doctrine. Under the Equal Footing Doctrine, the State holds title to the beds of Idaho's 
navigable iakes and streams "for the use and benefit of the whole people." Callahan v. Price, 26 
Idaho 745, 754, 146 P. 732, 735 (1915). "The scope of the state's title in such lands extends to 
the natural high water mark as it existed at the time the state was admitted into the Union." m, 
112 Idaho at 516, 733 P.2d at 737 (citations omitted). This Court in KEA cited the 1892 United 
States Supreme Court case of Illinois Cent. R.R. Co, v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), for "the 
principle that a state, as administrator of the trust in navigable waters on behalf of the public, 
does not have the power to abdicate its role as trustee in favor of private parties." a, 105 
Idaho at 625, 671 P.2d at 1088. Laying out the Supreme Court's holding, the Court in a 
expressly emphasizing such propositions as: "So with trusts connected with public property, or 
property of a special character, like lands under navigable waters; they cannot be placed entirely 
beyond the direction and control of the state," and "[tlhere can be no inepealable contract in a 
conveyance of property by a grantor in disregard of a public trust, under which he was bound to 
hold and manage it." Id. at 626, 671 P.2d at 1089 (citations omitted). Under this line of cases, 
the rule in Idaho is that any impairment or alienation of the State's submerged lands remains 
subject to the public trust. id. at 633, 671 P.2d at 1096; see also IFI, 112 Idaho at 521, 733 
P.2d at 742 ("[Flilled or otherwise drained trust land must remain impressed with the public trust 
and not subject to adverse possession.") (Huntley, Donaldson, & Bristline, JJ., concurring). 
Thus, even if ITD placed the fill adjacent to the littoral owner's property with the intent 
of extending the littoral owner's property out onto the laltebed, rather than for its own highway 
purposes, such act would be void as an unlawful disposition of submerged lands unless it met the 
strict standards provided in for alienation of submerged lands. The Court identified a two- 
part test to determine whether impairments and alienations of public trust property comply with 
the Public Trust Doctrine: "One, is the grant in aid of navigation, commerce, or other trust 
purposes, and two, does it substantially impair the public interest in the lands and waters 
remaining?" u, 105 Idaho at 626,671 P.2d at 1089. 
Here, the district court's holding that the placement of artificial fill on submerged lands 
for highway purposes provides to the littoral property owner an interest or benefit in such lands 
beyond those interests shared by other members of the public is contrary to the "central 
substantive thought in public trust litigation," In re Sanders Beach, 134 Idaho 443,454, 147 P.3d 
75, 85 (2006): 
[wlhen a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the general 
public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any governmental 
conduct which is calculated either to relocate that resource to more restricted uses 
or to subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties. 
Id. at 454, 147 P.3d at 85. The Court should therefore reverse the district court's finding that the 
Applicants' had a "right" or "benefit" to the State's submerged lands. 
Second, the district court failed to determine that extending the littoral property owner's 
property interests out over that portion of the lake covered with the highway fill was in aid of the 
trust purpose. u, 105 Idaho at 626, 671 P.2d at 1089. Providing title to the beds of Lake 
Coeur d'Alene in this case does not satisfy the purposes of the public trust, which include 
navigation, fish and wildlife habitat, recreation, aesthetic beauty and water quality. See FI, 112 
Idaho at 516, 733 P.2d at 737; see also Sanders Beach, 143 Idaho at 453, 147 P.3d at 85 ("In 
1927 the legislature expressly provided that lakeshores between the ordinary high- and low-water 
marks of Coeur d'Alene Lalce and two other lakes 'are hereby declared to be devoted to a public 
use in connection with the preservation of said lakes in their present condition as a health resort 
and recreation place for the inhabitants of the State."') (quoting 1927 Idaho Sess. Laws 6, 7 
(codified as amended at Idaho Code 4 67-4305)). The district court's recognition of a right or 
benefit in the fill overlying these submerged lands semed only one purpose--expanding the 
Apvlicants' property boundaries. It did not serve the public's interest in navigation, recreation, 
or wellness. As such, the grant fails this prong of the Public Trust Doctrine analysis as well. 
Third, the district court failed to determine whether recognition of a private right or 
benefit in the artificially filled submerged lands would "substantially impair the public interest in 
the lands and waters remaining." m, 105 Idaho at 626, 671 P.2d at 1089. It is axiomatic, 
however, that recognition of private ownership of the fill could lead to restrictions on public 
access or even exclusion of public recreational use. Currently, the highway right-of-way is used 
as not only a public highway, but also as a public parkway allowing public access to the 
shoreline of Coeur d'Alene Lake. Conceivably, recognition of private rights or benefits to the 
fill could lead to efforts to restrict use of the ITD easement to prohibit public recreational uses 
inconsistent with such private rights. At the very least the district court should have taken such 
potential impairment of public rights into consideration. 
Finally, the Court in KEA required that impairments of public trust property be open to 
public scrutiny. The Court held: "[P]ublic trust resources may only he alienated or impaired 
through open and visible actions, where the public is in fact informed of the proposed action and 
has substantial opportunity to respond to the proposed action before a final decision is made 
thereon." Id. at 628, 671 P.2d at 1091. In this case, there is nothing in the record to support a 
finding that any such notice or opportunity to participate ever occurred, especially where the 
existence of this grant only came to light upon issuance of the district court's decision. For that 
reason alone, the district court's decision to grant this portion of the State's property should be 
reversed. 
E. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING COSTS AND ATTORNEYS 
FEES TO THE APPLICANTS. 
I. Standard of Review 
Idaho Code 5 12-117 "provides the exclusive basis upon which to seek an award of 
attorney fees against a state agency." State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 
718, 723, 947 P.2d 391, 396 (1997). Subsection (1) requires a court to "award the prevailing 
party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the 
party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." 
This Court thus has made clear that "[tlhe statute is not discretionary but provides that the court 
must award attorney fees where a state agency did not act with a reasonable basis in fact or law 
in a proceeding involving a person who prevails in the action." Fischer v. Citi  of Ketchum, 141 
Idaho 349, 355-56, 109 P.3d 1091, 1097-98 (2005). "Where an agency acts without authority, it 
is acting without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Ralph Navlor Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 
144 Idaho 806, 809, 172 P.3d 1081, 1084 (2007) (citations omitted). However, if an agency acts 
upon a reasonable, but erroneous interpretation of law, then attorney fees should not be awarded. 
See id. (quoting Idaho Potato Comm'n v. Russet Valley Produce, Inc., 127 Idaho 654, 661, 904 
--
P.2d 566, 573 (1 995)). Therefore, a court considering an award of fees and expenses under 5 12- 
117 typically "look[s] to determine whether there was no authority at all for the agency's actions 
or whether, on the other hand, the law was not clear or unsettled as to whether the agency had the 
ability to act." Id. 
ii. IDL Played A Quasi-Judicial Role, Not An Adversarial Role, In This Case. 
The Land Board's role in this matter must be considered in determining whether they 
acted within a reasonable basis in fact or law. Its actions were, in large part, governed by the 
Lake Protection Act and the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. Once ITD presented its 
concerns, it was obligated under Idaho Code 5 58-1305 to determine whether such concerns 
constituted "the most unusual of circumstances" warranting the denial of the requested permits. 
For the reasons discussed above and in complete harmony with the arguments presented to it, the 
Land Board quite reasonably concluded that "the most unusual of circumstances" included 
situations where the intended uses would otherwise violate applicable laws. See Du~ont ,  134 
Idaho at 625, 7 P.3d at 1102. Acting within its quasi-judicial capacity, the Land Board's 
consideration of applicable state laws was well within its statutory authority and well within 
reason. 
The Land Board was not an adversary to the Applicants below; instead, the Land Board, 
through IDL, merely provided a forum for the Applicants and the objectors to present their cases. 
Furthermore, the Land Board did not advocate or take any action that increased the burden of the 
Applicants. The Land Board simply analyzed the facts and law presented to them and made a 
determination based thereon. And as set forth above in this brief, the Land Board's 
determinations were both reasonable and supported in fact and law. 
iii. The District Court Erred In Denying The Land Board's Motion To Strike 
The Supplemental Affidavit of John F. Magnuson And In Awarding The 
Applicants Post-Judgment Attorney Pees. 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) and 54(e)(5) require that any claim for attorney fees be filed no later 
than 14 days after the entry of judgment. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(a) and I.A.R. I l(f), all claims 
for attorney fees by the Applicants were due by April 7,2008-i.e., 14 days from the entry of the 
Court's March 24, 2008 Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal. I.R.C.P. 54(a) 
(defining "judgment" as including "any order from which an appeal lies"); I.A.R. ll(a)(2) 
(providing a right to appeal "[flrom any final decision or order of the district court on judicial 
review of an agency decision"). The Applicants filed their supplemental affidavit for additional 
attorney fees and costs on May 6,2008. Having been filed nearly a month later than required by 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Applicants' supplemental affidavit was untimely, and 
therefore, should have been stricken. 
Furthermore, prevailing parties are not entitled to recover post-judgment attorney fees. 
The Idaho Supreme Court made this clear in Allison v. John M. Biws. Inc., 121 Idaho 567, 826 
P.2d 91 6 (1 992), when it agreed that "a motion for post-judgment attorney fees is not allowed by 
any statute or rule, and cannot be properly considered a 'memorandum of costs' under I.R.C.P. 
54(d)(5)." Id. at 570, 826 P.2d at 919. That being the law in Idaho, the district court's award of 
$1,037.01 in post-judgment attorney fees should be reversed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The district court's order should be vacated, and the Land Board's order denying the 
Applicants' proposed lake encroachment permits should be affirmed. Alternatively, the Land 
Board's order should be set aside and these matters should be remanded to the Land Board for 
further proceedings as necessary. 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The instant appeal arises under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Pursuant to 
the Idaho Lake Protection Act, I.C. § 58-1301 et seq., Respondents Chris Keenan (Keenan) and 
Lake CDA Investments, LLC (Lake CDA) had each applied lo the Idaho Department of Lands 
(IDL) for a navigational encroachment permit in order to build a single family dock. Keenan and 
Lake CDA each owned property that at one time had bordered Lake Coeur d'Alene, but since at 
least 1940 have been subject to a public right-of-way easement that encompasses the old 
shoreline of their properties. Thus, each proposed dock would extend out into Lake Coeur 
d'Alene from the public right-of-way that is Lake Coeur d'Alene Drive. The Idaho 
Transportation Department (ITD) intervened in the administrative process and objected to the 
applications. A hearing was held, following which the IDL denied the permit applications. 
Pursuant to I.C. 5 67-5273, Keenan and Lake CDA sought judicial review of the IDL decision by 
filing a petition with the district court of the First Judicial District, County of Kootenai. The 
district court reversed the decision of the IDL, and the ITD and IDL filed timely appeals to this 
Court. 
B. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition 
Lake CDA and Keenan own property on Lake Coeur d'Alene along Lake Coeur d'Alene 
Drive about one mile east of the city of Coeur d'Alene, just southeast of Silver Beach Marina. In 
1940, the state of Idaho purchased an easement for a public right-of-way that ran along the old 
shore line of the lake through what is now the Keenan and Lake CDA properties. The easement 
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actually covered the shoreline and extended out into the lake. That right-of-way is now Lake 
Coeur D'Alene Drive, and is controlled by the Idaho Transportation Board acting through the 
ITD. 
On July 3 1,2006, Lake CDA filed an application (No. L-95-S-5 130) with the IDL for a 
navigational encroachment permit in order to build a single family dock that would extend out 
onto the bed of Lake Coeur d'Alene. The dock would also encroach on the Lake Coeur d7Alene 
Drive public right-of-way. IDL controls encroachments onto the lakebeds of Idaho pursuant to 
I.C. 5 58-1303. On November 17,2006, Keenan, who owns property adjacent to the Lake CDA 
property, filed an application (No. L-95-S-5146) with the IDL for a navigational encroachment 
permit to build a single family dock that would extend out onto the bed of Lake Coeur d'Alene 
and also encroach on the Lake Coeur d'Alene Drive public right-of-way. Both applications were 
denied based on the objections of ITD that the docks would interfere with the maintenance and 
control of the right-of-way, and potentially compromise the integrity of the roadway. 
Both parties appealed the initial denial of their respective applications and an "Order for 
Contested Case Hearing and Notice of Hearing" was issued by the IDL on January 24,2002. 
Given the common questions of law and fact, the two applications were consolidated and 
assigned Case No. L-LP-06-002. A hearing was held on March 30,2007. On May 18,2007, the 
hearing officer made recommended findings that were adopted by the Director of the IDL on 
May 21,2007. 
In the findings adopted by the IDL, the hearing officer recognized that the ITD, pursuant 
to I.C. $5  40-310(9) and 40-310(10), as well as I.C. 5 40-313(2), has the authority to control and 
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restrict encroachments onto a state highway right-of-way. He also concluded that the case of 
Bowman v. McGoldrick Lumber Co., 38 Idaho 30,219 P. 1063 (1923), held that an easement for 
a right-of-way can sever the riparian rights held by a littoral property owner. Thus, even though 
Lake CDA and Keenan still retained ownership of the littoral rights associated with their 
property, to include the right to wharf out into the lake, they could not exercise those rights as 
long as the public highway existed over the property shoreline and extended out into the lake on 
fill placed by the state onto the lakebed. 
The hearing officer also found that the encroachments on to the public right-of-way could 
compromise the integrity of the roadway, as well as impair the ability of the ITD to maintain and 
repair the roadway. Because the ITD controls encroachment permits for encroachments on to 
any public right-of-way pursuant to IDAPA 5 39.03.42, and ITD made clear that it would not 
issue an encroachment permit to Keenan or Lake CDA, the hearing officer found that it would be 
improvident for IDL to grant a navigational encroachment permit. In its Final Order, dated May 
2 1,2007, the State Board of Land Commissioners adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law of the Hearing Officer, thereby denying the Encroachment Permits L-95-S-5130 and L- 
95-S-5146. R., p. 36. 
On June 7,2007, Keenan and Lake CDA each filed a petition for review of the IDL Final 
Order with the First Judicial District in Kootenai County. The ITD filed a motion to intervene in 
each case on June 15,2007. The parties stipulated to the intervention of the ITD and filed the 
stipulations with the court on July 7,2007. Based on the stipulations, the district court issued 
orders on the same day making the ITD a defendantlrespondent in the action. The parties then 
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filed a stipulation to consolidate the cases, and on July 30, 2007, the district court issued orders 
consolidating the cases under Case No. CV-06-8728 (the Lake CDA case number). 
The district court held a hearing on the consolidated petitions on February 5,2008, and 
issued its "Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal" on March 24,2008. Therein, the 
district court reversed the holding of the IDL, finding that the landowners Keenan and Lake 
CDA retained the right to wharf out into Lake Coeur d'Alene regardless of the existence of the 
public right-of-way that ran along the shore line and extended into the lake. The district court 
reached its decision without addressing the fact that the landowners did not have an 
encroachment permit from the ITD. The district court held that the petitioners had met their 
burden under each standard set forth in LC. § 67-5279, and that the decision of the agency was 
therefore reversed. 
Keenan and Lake CDA then filed a memorandum of attorney fees and costs on March 27, 
2008, seeking recovery of amounts expended through February 29,2008. The ITD and IDL filed 
timely objections to the fees and costs memorandum on April 10 and 11,2008, respectively. The 
ITD and IDL also filed a timely notice of appeal from the court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Appeal. Prior to the hearing on the fees and costs request, Keenan and Lake CDA 
sought an additional amount of attorney fees for work done after the court entered its 
memorandum decision. 
On May 8,2008, the district court held a hearing on attorney fees and costs and issued its 
decision on May 20,2008, awarding $23,334.51 in attorney fees and costs, including $1,282.50 
in attorney fees incurred after the district court issued its decision, to Keenan and Lake CDA. 
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On May 27,2008, the district court entered a judgment against the ITD in the amount of 
$1 1,564.26 for its share of the attorney fees and costs due Keenan and Lake CDA, and another 
judgment against the IDL in the same amount for its share. The ITD and IDL then filed 
amended notices of appeal to include the judgment on the award of attorney fees and costs. 
C. Statement of the Facts 
Because neither Keenan nor Lake CDA challenged the facts as determined by the IDL at 
the agency level, and because the district court is to accept such facts, the following facts are 
gleaned from the recommended findings as determined by the hearing officer and adopted by the 
IDL. 
One of the predecessors in interest of the Keenan and Lake CDA properties, L.B. 
Armstrong, entered into an agreement in 191 1 with Kootenai County, by which agreement 
Armstrong granted Kootenai County a sixteen foot wide easement across his property for the 
purposes of a public highway for a period of 99 years. R., p. 28. In 1925, Armstrong entered 
into another agreement with Kootenai County, expanding the public right-of-way to fifty feet 
wide and extending the period of the agreement so that it was in perpetuity. R., p. 28. The 
agreements of 191 1 and 1925 contemplated the retention of littoral rights with the property 
owner. R., pp. 31-32. 
In 1940, another predecessor in interest of the Keenan and Lake CDA properties, Vera 
and Jack Smith, executed a right-of-way deed conveying to the state of Idaho additional property 
for the public right-of-way. R., p. 28. The deed expanded the easement to a width of one 
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hundred twenty-five (125) feet, to include fifty (50) feet to the left of the centerline (landward) 
and seventy-five (75) feet to the right, or water ward, of the easement centerline. R., p. 28. 
The 1940 public right-of-way easement granted by the Smiths to the state involved only 
0.92 acres of the Smiths' property, while the remainder of the easement, 1.240 acres, consisted of 
state-owned lake bed. R., p. 32. The implication of the right-of-way extending in to the lake and 
over the original shoreline was that the state would be filling in the lake bed to create a usable 
right-of-way. R., p. 32. Large amounts of fill were, in fact, placed "in front of the natural 
shoreline of the subject properties." R., p. 29. As a result of the fill placed by the state, the 
"original shoreline is landward of the current shoreline, as is shown by the compilation of the 
historical as built drawings and the significant fill from the construction that took place as a 
result of the 1940 Right-of-way Deed". R., p. 33. 
The navigational encroachments sought by Keenan and Lake CDA have a "high 
probability" of compromising the ability of ITD to "maintain and repair the structural integrity of 
the 'highway'." R., p. 32. Therefore, ITD would be unwilling to authorize the encroachment of 
the docks onto the public right-of-way. R., p. 33. 
The original shoreline orthe Keenan and Lake CDA property has been obliterated by the 
right-of-way and the fill placed in the lake to create the right-of-way that resulted from the 1940 
deed. R., p. 33. Therefore, as a matter of law, based on this Court's decision in Bowman v. 
McGoldrick, the properties no longer have littoral rights that Keenan and Lake CDA can exercise 
as such rights have been "sever[ed]" from the property. R., p. 3 1. In essence, the littoral rights 
became subordinate to the 1940 highway easement. Having lost the right to wharf out, Keenan 
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and Lake CDA are "not qualified to make application according to IDAPA § 20.03.04.020.02" 
for a navigational encroachment permit. R., p. 33. 
A navigational encroachment permit issued by the IDL requires the applicant to obtain all 
other necessary permits. R., p. 33. See, IDAPA 9 20.03.04.020.03. Because the ITD controls 
encroachment on the public highway right-of-way, and made clear it would not issue an 
encroachment permit to Keenan or to Lake CDA, the proposed docks would not be in 
compliance with an IDL permit and therefore denial of the applications is appropriate. R., p. 33. 
11. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court improperly reverse the agency decision denying respondent 
property owners a permit to build a dock by concluding that the property owners, as fee 
simple owners of property subservient to an easement for a public highway, could build a 
dock or related structure upon the easement without a right-of-way encroachment permit 
from the ITD? 
2. Did the district court improperly reverse the agency decision denying property owners 
a permit to build a dock by determining that an easement for a public right-of-way does 
not prevent respondents from exercising their littoral rights, specifically the right to wharf 
out from the public right-of-way? 
3. Did the district court improperly award attorney fees and costs to property owners? 
111. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
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"When reviewing a decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity, this 
Court directly reviews the district court's decision." State v. Hudelson, 146 Idaho 439,442,196 
P.3d 905,908 (2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670,672, 183 P.3d 758,760 
(2008)). See also, State v. Doe, 145 Idaho 662,664,182 P.3d 1196, 1198 (2008) ("When the 
district court acts in an appellate capacity, this Court reviews the decision of the district court 
directly."). In reviewing the district court decision, this Court should look to the criteria set forth 
in I.C. 5 67-5279. Brett v. Eleventh Street Dockowner's Association, Inc., 141 Idaho 517, 112 
This Court stated in Losser v. Bradstreet, supra, that it was taking the opportunity "to 
clarify a procedural issue that [it has] created in cases involving appeals from the district court in 
which the district court has served as an intermediate appellate court." Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 
Idaho at 672, 183 P.3d at 760. This Court went on to explain that it was to review the decision of 
the district court acting in its appellate capacity: 
The structure of the Idaho Appellate Rules (I.A.R.) clearly reflects that our role is 
to review the decisions of the district court. I.A.R. 4 provides that "[alny party 
aggrieved by an appealable judgment, order or decree, as defined in these rules, of 
a district co urt... may appeal such decision to the Supreme Court.. ." I.A.R. 
2(b)(l) defines "district court" and provides that " 'district court' shall incIude the 
district courts of all judicial districts but shall not include the magistrates divisions 
thereof." I.A.R. 1 l(a)(2) provides that a party may appeal, as a matter of right to 
this Court "[d]ccisions by the district court dismissing, affirming, reversing or 
remanding an appeal." After this Court has rendered a final decision in such an 
appeal, a remittitur is issued and filed with the district court. I.A.R. 38(c). This 
remittitur "shall advise the district court ... that the opinion has become final and 
that the district co urt... shall forthwith comply with the directive of the opinion." 
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Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho at 672, 183 P.3d at 760. In Losser, this Court observed that in 
previous decisions it had stated that its role had been to review "the trial court (magistrater' 
record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the 
magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those 
findings'', and if "those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the 
district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [this C o w  affirm[s] the district court's 
decision as a matter of procedure." Id 
However, this Court determined in Losser that such review of magistrate records was 
incorrect: 
Thus, for nearly two decades, [this Court has] effectively ignored the structure of 
our appellate rules and issued opinions in which we have directly addressed the 
decision of the magistrate. Indeed, we have done so recently. [cite omitted] We 
have determined that this practice represents an erroneous conflation of our 
standard of appellate review with the structure of our appellate rules. 1- 
decision, and henceforth. our decisions will reflect our ap~lication of the Idaho 
Appellate Rules. 
Id. (emphasis added). Applying the same logic to an appeal &om a district court acting in an 
appellate capacity from an administrative decision such as the instant case, this Court should 
directly review the decision of the district court rather than the agency decision or record. 
Rule 4, I.A.R., states that any party may appeal an "appealable judgment, order or decree 
. . . of a district court, the Public Utilities Commission or the Industrial Commission". No 
exception is listed for orders arising from contested cases determined by a state agency. Rule 
2(b)(l), I.A.R., sets forth the definition of "district court", and the definition does not include 
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state agencies. Further, the definition of "administrative agency" set forth in Rule 2(b)(5) 
includes only the Public Utilities Commission and the Industrial Commission. 
Finally, Rule 1 l(f), I.A.R., states that "[a]n appeal as a matter of right may be taken to the 
Supreme Court from the following judgments and orders: From any final decision or order of 
the district court on judicial review of an agency decision." There appears to be no appellate rule 
that permits a direct appeal from an agency decision or that authorizes this Court to directly 
review an agency decision or record. 
This Court has not specifically held that it should apply the standard of review identified 
in Losser to an appeal from a district court acting in an intermediate appellate capacity from an 
administrative contested case decision. In fact, in a decision more recent than Losser, this Court 
has stated that it will review the agency decision independently of the district court decision in 
such cases: 
This Court independently reviews the agency's decision. We give serious 
consideration to the district court's decision, but review the matter as if the case 
were directly appealed from the agency. 
St. Alphonsus Regioizal Medical Center, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, 
146 Idaho 51,53,190 P.3d 870,872 (2008) (quoting Bonner Gen. Hosp. v. Bonner Co., 133 
Idaho 7,9,981 P.2d 242,244 (1999)). In specific relation to an appeal from a decision made by 
the IDL, this Court has stated that the following is the standard of review to be applied: 
Judicial review of agency decisions is governed by the Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act, Idaho Code title 67, chapter 52. Idaho Code 4 67-5279(3) 
provides that a court shall affirm an agency action unless the court finds that the 
agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are "(a) in violation of 
constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the 
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agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial 
evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion." A reviewing court "shall not substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Idaho Code 5 67- 
5279(1). Regardless of whether the agency action meets the standard set forth in 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3), "agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial 
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." Idaho Code 5 67-5279(4); see 
generally Sagewillow, Inc., v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 138 Idaho 831, 
835-36,70 P.3d 669,673-74 (2003)(court review of agency decisions). 
"On an appeal from the district court's decision on that petition [for judicial 
review under the APA], this Court reviews the agency record independently of the 
district court's decision." Sagewillow, Inc., 138 Idaho at 836, 70 P.3d at 674 
(citation omitted). The Court's role is to review the matter to ensure compliance 
with the applicable standards. Id. If these standards are not met, the agency action 
" ... shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as 
necessary" in accordance with the Court's discretion. Idaho Code 5 67-5279(3); 
see also Sagewillow, Inc., 138 Idaho at 836,70 P.3d at 674. 
Brett v. Eleventh Street Dockowner'.? Association, Inc., 141 Idaho 517, 521, 112 P.3d 805, 809 
(2005). In Sagewillow, Inc., v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, this Court stated the appropriate 
standard is to review the agency decision: 
A party aggrieved by a IinaI order in a contested case decided by an agency may 
file a petition for judicial review in the district court. Idaho Code $5 67-5270(3) 
(2001). On an appeal from the district court's decision on that petition, this Court 
reviews the agency record independently ofthe district court's decision. Sanders 
Orchard v. Gem Counfy, Idaho, 137 Idaho 695, 52 P.3d 840 (2002). This Court 
does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the 
evidence presented. Id.; Idaho Code 5 67-5279(1) (2001). Rather, this Court 
defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. The 
agency order may be overturned only where it: (a) violates statutory or 
constitutional provisions; (b) exceeds the agency's statutory authority; (c) was 
made upon unlawful procedure; (d) is not supported by substantial evidence in the 
record as a whole; or (e) is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In 
addition, the order must be upheld if substantial rights of the appellant have not 
been prejudiced. Sanders Orchard v. Gem County, Idaho, 137 Idaho 695,52 P.3d 
840 (2002); Idaho Code 5 67-5279(4) (2001). If the order is not affirmed, it shall 
be set aside in whole or in part and the case remanded. Idaho Code 5 67-5279 
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Sagewillow, Inc., v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 138 Idaho 831, 835-36, 70 P.3d 669, 673- 
74 (2003) (emphasis added). In addition to the Brett and Sagewillow decisions, this Court has 
stated in a number of other cases that it reviews the agency record independent of the district 
court's decision.' 
This Court has also held that it reviews the agency decision, rather than the agency 
record, upon review of a district court decision involving an agency determination: "On appeal, 
we review the agency's decision directly, independent of the district court's determination." 
Willig v. State, 127 Idaho 259,261,899 P.2d 969,971 (1995) (citing Boise Group Homes, Inc. v. 
I 
Dep'l ofHealth & Welfare, 123 Idaho 908,909,854 P.2d 251,252 (1993)).~ 
I Given the logic expressed by this Court in Losser v. Bradstreet, supra, the appropriate 
I 
standard of review in the instant case would appear to be a review of the district court decision in 
light of the criteria set forth in I.C. 3 67-5279. Adopting that standard of review would put to I 
I rest what appears to be a discrepancy regarding the standard applied to a review of a district 
court decision when it is sitting in an appellate capacity from an agency decision. 
Regardless of the standard of review applied, an "agency's factual determinations are 
binding upon [an appellate court] even where there is conflicting evidence, so long as the 
' Haw v. State Board of Medicine, 143 Idaho 51,53, 137 P.3d 438,440 (2006); Marshall v. Department of 
Transportation, 137 Idaho 337,340,48 P.3d 666,669 (2002); Sanders Orchard v. Gem County, 137 Idaho 695,697, 
52 P.3d 840,842 (2002); Price v. Payette County Board of Commissioners, 13 1 Idaho 426,429,958 P.2d 583,586 
(1998); Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923,926,950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998). 
See, also, Mercy Medical Center v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 226,229 192 P.3d 1050, 1053 (2008); St. Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, 146 Idaho 51, 53, 190 P.3d 870, 
872 (2008); Bonner Gen. Hosp. v. Banner Co., 133 Idaho 7,9, 981 P.2d 242,244 (1999). 
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determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record." Staff of the 
Idaho Real Estate Commission v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 633, 22 P.3d 105, 108 (2001) 
(quoting Price v. Payette County Board of County Commissioners, 131 Idaho 426,429,958 P.2d 
583, 586 (1998) (citing Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 
(1998)). Further, this Court "may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the administrative 
agency on questions of fact." St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Ada County, 146 Idaho 5 1, 53, 190 P.3d 870, 872 (2008). Moreover, neither 
Keenan nor Lake CDA challenged the agency's factual findings at the district court level, and 
should not be permitted to do so now. 
In this case, the outcome should not change regardless of the standard used. The district 
court rendered its decision essentially as a matter of law based on the facts as determined by the 
IDL. Because the district court's application of the law was incorrect, its decision was wrong in 
light of the criteria set forth in I.C. 9 67-5279, and should be reversed. 
B. The State Controls Encroachment upon a Highway Right-of-way. 
One reason relied upon by the IDL in refusing to grant a navigational encroachment 
permit to Keenan and Lake CDA was that the state, acting through the ITD, would not have 
given either landowner a permit to encroach upon the public right-of-way of Lake Coeur d'Alene 
Drive. Even if the IDL had granted the navigational encroachment permit to Keenan and Lake 
CDA, they would still be required to obtain a right-of-way encroachment permit from the ITD. 
IDAPA $20.03.04.020.03 ("Nothing in these rules shall excuse a person seeking to make an 
encroachment from obtaining any additional approvals iawfblly required by federal, local or 
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other state agencies."). Because Keenan and Lake CDA did not have a permit to encroach on the 
Lake Coeur d'Alene Drive right-of-way, and the ITD had made clear its position that it would 
not give them one, the IDL properly denied the application.3 
The district court failed to even address the issue, yet the impact of its decision, if 
allowed to stand, would be to overturn case law and render relevant statutes mneaningless. 
Because the law is squarely on the side of the IDL decision on this issue, this Court should 
reverse the decision of the district court for this reason alone. 
The law in Idaho appears well-settled that the "state in its sovereign capacity and in the 
exercise of its police power, may regulate, limit, or prohibit the use of the highways 'for private 
purposes'." State ex rel. Burns v. Kelly, 89 Idaho 139, 143, 403 P.2d 566, 567 (1965) (citing 
State ex rel. Rich v. Idaho Power Company, 81 Idaho 487,346 P.2d 596 (1959); Lewis v. Lorenz, 
144 Colo. 23, 354 P.2d 1008 (1960); Carlton v. Pacific Coasf Gasoline Co., 110 Cai.App.2d 
177, 242 P.2d 391 (1952)). "The power of the state and its political subdivisions to require 
removal of a nuisance or obstruction, which in anywise interferes with the public use of streets 
and highways cannot be questioned." State ex rel. Rich v. Idaho Power Company, 81 Idaho at 
50 1, 346 P.2d at 603. As this Court stated long ago: 
In the same vein this Court has stringently held to the theory that the governing 
bodies (cities, counties or the state) have broad authority over use of the streets 
and highways, and may in proper cases remove and prevent anything which is an 
encroachment upon or interferes with the use of a street or highway.4 
~othining in the record reflects that Keenan or Lake CDA have ever applied to the ITD for an encroachment permit. 
4 . .  C~tlng Rief v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 63 Idaho 418, 120 P.2d 823 (1941); Yellow Cab Taxi Service v. City 
of Twin Falls, 68 Idaho 145,190 P.2d 681 (1948); ,Boise City v. Sinsel 72 Idaho 329,241 P.2d 173 (1952); ViNnge 
ofLapwaiv. ANigiw, 78 Idaho 124,299 P.2d 475 (1956); Rich v. Burdick, 83 Idaho 335,362 P.2d 1088 (1961); 
Bare v. Dept. ofHighways, 88 Idaho 467,401 P.2d 552 (1965); Snyder v. State, 92 Idaho 175,438 P.2d 920 (1968). 
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Boise Cityv. Fails, 94 Idaho 840, 846,499 P.2d 326,332 (1972). 
Kelly is dispositive of the instant appeal. Therein, the defendant, Kelly, owned the land 
over which a right-of-way for a state highway existed. He argued that he was entitled to use that 
portion of his land over which the right-of-way passed, but was not being used for highway 
travel. Based on that belief, he had erected a sign on the right-of-way, but not on the part of the 
right-of-way used for highway purposes. 
This Court rejected Kelly's argument, relying on the case law cited above, the definition 
of a "highway" as defined by statute (now found at I.C. $ 40-109), and this Court's decision in 
Bare v. Department of Highways, 88 Idaho 467,401 P.2d 552 (196S), as well as People v. 
Henderson, 194 P.2d 91 (Ct.App.Ca1. 1948). In Kelly, this Court set forth the following quote 
from Henderson: 
It is a well-settled principle of common-law, which has frequently been embodied 
in statutory fonn, that a structure maintained upon a public roadway is unlawful 
(citing cases), and is a nuisance per se subject to abatement at the instance of 
proper authority. (citing cases.) It is no defense to an action based thereon that the 
structure is off the traveled part of the highway or that sufficient areas remain to 
allow public use of the right of way in the accustomed manner. (citing cases.) 
Where the sole question is whether the maintenance of the structure or obstruction 
is inconsistent with the full enjoyment of the right of way by the public, the 
owner of the fee is deemed to possess no greater rights than those who are 
strangers to the title. (citing cases.) 
Kelly, 89 Idaho at 146-47, 403 P.2d at 570 (quoting People v. Henderson, 194 P.2d at 93) 
(emphasis added). No exception fiom the holding of Kelly exists permitting the exercise of 
littoral rights on a public highway right-of-way without a permit from the ITD, and one should 
certainly not be carved out in this case. Keenan and Lake CDA have no more right to build a 
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structure on a state highway right-of-way without a permit from the ITD than any other person. 
- 
Based on Kelly, this court should reverse the decision of the district court. 
A holding similar to Kelly is set forth in City of Nampa v. Swayne, 97 Idaho 530, 547 
P.2d 1135 (1976). In Swayne, the city of Nampa and the state worked together to widen 12* 
Avenue South through the downtown area of Nampa. As a result of widening the street, two 
business signs hung over the street, although only over the part of the street used for parking. 
The city eventually sought and was granted an injunction against the businesses to have the signs 
removed. The business owners appealed. 
On appeal, the business owners agreed that their signs encroached upon the street right- 
of-way, but asserted that a "factual question is raised as to whether or not those encroachments 
obstruct or otherwise materially or unreasonably interfere with the use and enjoyment of a public 
right-of-way." City of Nampa v. Swayne, 97 Idaho at 532,547 P.2d at 1137. This Court rejected 
that argument, relying on, among other cases, Boise City v. Fails, 94 Idaho 840, 499 P.2d 326 
(1972); State v. Kelly, supra; and People v. Henderson, supra. Quoting People v. Henderson, 
this Court stated that a "structure maintained upon a public roadway is unlawful [citations 
omitted] and is a nuisance per se subject to abatement at the instance of proper authority 
[citations omitted]. City of Nampa v. Swayne, 97 Idaho at 533,547 P.2d at 1138 (quoting People 
v. Henderson, 194 P.2d at 93). 
In People v. Henderson, supra, the defendant owned land in fee simple that was subject 
to a highway easement. The defendant landowner constructed a temporary shed within the 
boundaries of the easement, but not on the highway or its shoulder. The state filed suit against 
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the landowner to have the shed removed, and the trial court held for the state. The landowner 
appealed, arguing that ihe shed did not interfere with the highway and was located on an unused 
portion of the easement. In fact, the shed did not obstruct any use being made of the easement. 
On appeal, the state of California "did not claim that the shed interfered in any manner 
with the free use of the highway by the public." Rather, the state argued that the shed 
"encroached upon the right of the public to use every part of the right of way at any time without 
interference; that the fact that there was no interference with the actual uses that were being 
made of the right of way is immaterial; that the shed as maintained constituted a nuisance subject 
to abatement in the present action; and that defendants had and could have no right to maintain 
the shed on the right of way except as the holders of a permit issued by the State Department of 
Public Works, which permits defendants had not received or applied for." People v. Henderson, 
194 P.2d at 92-93. The state further asserted that the "authority to determine whether a 
contemplated private use is consistent with the full enjoyment of the easement acquired by the 
public has been vested by the legislature in the Department of Public Works, and that this is an 
exclusive jurisdiction." People v. Henderson, 194 P.2d at 93. 
The court agreed with the state: 
We do not doubt the correctness of the state's position. It is a well-settied 
principle of common law, which has frequently been embodied in statutory form, 
that a structure maintained upon a public roadway is unlawfiil [cites omitted], and 
is a nuisance per se subject to abatement at the instance of proper authority. [cites 
omitted] It is no defense to an action based thereon that the structure is off the 
traveled part of the highway or that sufficient areas remain to allow public use of 
the right of way in the accustomed manner. [cites omitted] Where the sole 
question is whether the mainfenance of the structure or obstruction is 
inconsistent with the full enjoyment of the right of way by thepublic, the owner 
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of the fee & deemed to possess no greater rights then [sic] those who are 
strangers to the title. [cites omitted] Independently of the statutory law, 
therefore, it would have been proper to enjoin the defendants from maintaining 
the shed on the state's right of way. The judgment is supportable upon this 
ground alone. 
People v. Henderson, 194 P.2d at 93 (emphasis added). 
The Henderson c o w  also discussed the permitting process as it related to the 
landowner's desire to maintain a shed on the right-of-way easement. It noted that had the 
defendant landowner applied for an encroachment permit, "defendants as owners of the fee 
would have had no greater right than those who were strangers to the title", and that "[alny 
structure or obstruction that would be unlawful if maintained by a stranger to the title would also 
be unlawful if maintained by the owner of the fee." People v. Henderson, 194 P.2d at 94. 
The landowner in Henderson had not applied to the Department of Public Works for an 
encroachment permit. The court pointed out that in order for the landowners to prevent the state 
from interfering with their ability to maintain the shed, they would have had to show that they 
had exhausted their administrative remedies by first applying for an encroachment permit. 
People v. Henderson, 194 P.2d at 94. The court further noted that it would have been within the 
discretion of the Department of Public Works to grant or deny the permit application. The court 
left no doubt that the state had the right and authority to control encroachment upon a right-of- 
way easement for a highway: 
{I]t would be in clear violation of the rights and interests of the public to follow a 
general policy of permitting structures and obstructions of various types to be 
maintained upon public rights of way. The reasons for this are so clearly apparent 
that they need not be stated. A line must be drawn between those encroachments 
that would, and those that would not, infringe upon the rights and be adverse to 
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the interests of the public, and that line must necessarily be drawn by the 
Department of Public Works in the proper exercise of its discretion. 
People v. Henderson, 194 P.2d at 94. The same logic applies to the case at bar. The ITD 
controls encroachments upon a state highway right-of-way, and Keenan and Lake CDA have no 
more right to encroach upon such a right-of-way without an ITD permit than a stranger to the 
title of their property. The exercise of littoral rights, specifically the right to wharf out into a 
body of water, is no exception to that clear rule of law. 
The concept that a landowner cannot encroach upon an unused portion of a highway 
right-of-way is certainly not new: 
The space between the made road and the exterior limits of the located highway 
may be required for various purposes; as for making and keeping in repair the 
travelled path; for making sluices and watercourses; for furnishing earth to raise 
the road. And, not infrequently, from the location of the road and from its 
exposure to be obstructed by snow, the entire width of the located road is required 
to be kept open, to guard against accumulations of snow that might otherwise 
wholly obstruct the public travel at such seasons. For these and other uses, in aid 
of what is the leading object, the keeping in good repair of the made or travelled 
road, the general easement in the public, acquired by the location of a highway, is 
coextensive with the exterior limits of the located highway; and the question of 
nuisance or no nuisance does not depend upon the fact, whether that part of the 
highway, which is alleged to have been unlawfully entered upon and obstructed 
by the defendant, was a portion of the highway capable of being used by the 
traveler. Whether it be so or not, an entry upon the located highway, and 
occupation of any portion of it by deposits of lumber, stones, &c. would be a 
nuisance, and subject the party to an indictment therefor. 
We do not perceive any new principle to be settled in the decision of this case. It 
is only the frequently occurring case of an indictment for a nuisance upon a 
highway. Such indictment, charging acts of similar character to the present, have 
always been sustained as good at common law. 
Commonwealth v. King, 54 Mass. 115, 118-19 (Mass. 1847). 
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Not only is the question settled by common law and case law, it is also settled by 
legislative action, as this Court also noted in Kelly. I.C. 5 40-2319 empowers a highway district 
to remove any encroachment upon a public right-of-way. See also, I.C. $$ 40-310(9) and 40- 
313(2), and IDAPA 39.03.42, which mandate standards for encroachments on state highway 
right-of-ways. 
Plainly, the district court erred when it held that Keenan and Lake CDA have the right to 
wharf out into Lake Coeur d'Alene without an encroachment permit from the ITD. The 
judgment of the district court should be reversed. 
C. Littoral Rights are Subordinate to a Public Highway Easement. 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal issued on March 24,2008, the district 
court made the conclusory statement that the decision of the IDL is, "pursuant to Idaho Code 5 
67-5279: '(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, (b) in excess of the statutory 
authority of the agency, (c) made upon unlawful procedure, [and] (d) not supported by 
substantial evidence on the record as a whole.' " R., p. 334. The district court further 
concluded, without explanation, that "since the IDL approved [a neighbor's] application just 
before denying these two applications, the IDL's decisions are (e) 'arbitrary, capricious, [and] an 
abuse of discretion' under Idaho Code $ 67-5279." R., p. 334-35. The district court based those 
statements largely upon its determination that Keenan and Lake CDA had retained the right to 
exercise their littoral rights in the face of the 1940 grant of a public right-of-way to the state, and 
because the fill placed by the state in Lake Coeur d7Alene to build the highway belonged to 
Keenan and Lake CDA. The district court is wrong on both counts as a matter of law. 
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1. The public right-of-way severed the right of Keenan and Lake CDA to 
wharf out into Lake Coeur d'Alene. 
The district court rejected the holding of Bowman v. McGoldrick Lumber, Co., 38 Idaho 
30,2 19 P. 1063 (1 923), wherein this Court found that a railroad right-of-way can sever riparian 
rights. The district court believed that Bowman is inapposite because it involved an easement for 
a railroad right-of-way: 
There [referring to K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Roberts, 152 U.S. 114,14 Sup.Ct. 496,38 
L.Ed. 3771 it is held that such grants [from the federal statute 3 Fed. Stat. Ann. 
51 1,30 Stat. at Large 990 (U.S. Comp. St. §§ 4181-4188)J have the 'attributes of 
the fee, perpetuity and exclusive use and possession."'. . .Under said decision it is 
apparent that the nature of the grant made in this case as to the right of way and 
station grounds is a base, qualified, or limited fee and is more than a mere 
easement, giving the exclusive possession and right of use of the land for the 
purposes contemplated by the law. 
R., p. 331-32 (quoting Bowman, 38 Idaho at 33,219 P. at 1064). The district court disparaged 
the ITD, asserting that its reliance on Bowman is incredible because "[tlhe situation in Bowman 
is not even remotely similar" to the instant case. R., p. 332. The district court was adamant in its 
insistence that the difference between Bowman and the case at bar is that "the railroad's right-of- 
way was a grant from an act of Congress of the United States, and that grant was given to the 
railroad before Bertha Bowman received her patent from the government for her property." R., 
p. 332. However, when the easement was granted to the railroad in Bowman or to the state in 
the case at bar is of no legal moment, and the district court failed to explain otherwise. 
The district court charged the IDL with being "no less deceptive than the ITD" in its 
reliance on Bowman. R., p. 332. The district court castigated the IDL for its "ignorance of the 
fact that the railroad's right-of-way was a grant from an act of Congress of the United States 
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given to the railroad before Bertha Bowman received her patent from the government for her 
property." R., p. 332. The IDL, according to the district court, was also being deceptive by 
asserting that the property owners' riparian rights were "subordinated" to the easement granted 
to the state by the landowners' predecessor's in interest. R., p. 332. The district court seemed to 
find great significance in the lack of the use of the word "subordination" in the Bowman 
decision. R., p. 332. The district court claimed that the "subordination" concept "was made up 
out of whole cloth by the [IDL] Hearing Examiner." R., p. 333. 
Both the logic and the comments of the district court are without basis in law or fact. 
Interestingly, the district court never explains why it attributes such great significance to the fact 
that the railroad easement is the result of an act of congress. In particular, the district court does 
not distinguish between a "mere easement", an easement for a state highway and an easement 
granted to a railroad. The district court fails to even discuss which easements have, as did the 
railroad easement in Bowman "the attributes of the fee, perpetuity and exclusive use and 
possession." Bowman, 38 Idaho at 33,219 P. at 1064. 
Plainly, a public highway easement and a railroad easement are both much more than a 
"mere easement", Certainly, a much stronger argument exists that the pubic highway easement 
has greater legal stature than an easement granted to a private railroad company. The public 
highway has even greater attributes of fee than a "mere easement", which must be presumed to 
be a reference to a private easement. 
In Bowman v. McGoldrick Lumber Co., 38 Idaho 30,219 P. 1063 (1923), this Court held 
that a railroad right-of-way, granted pursuant to an act of Congress, "is a base, qualified, or 
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limited fee and is more than a mere easement, giving the exclusive possession and right of use of 
the land for the purposes contemplated by the law ..." Bowman, 38 Idaho a t ,  219 P. aF1064. 
Based on such reasoning, this Court held that the landowner, Bowman, had no riparian rights 
where the railroad easement went down to high water mark of Lake Coeur d'Alene. Bowman, 38 
Idaho at -, 219 P. at 1065. 
In holding that the railway easement was "more than a mere easement," this Court relied 
upon Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. v. Stalker, 14 Idaho 371,94 P. 56, (1908), which in turns 
cites M, K. & T. Railway Co. v. Roberts, 152 U.S; 114,14 S.Ct. 496,38 L.Ed. 377 (1894). The 
Bowman court, referencing the M K. & 7: Ry. Co. decision, stated that railroad right-of-way 
grants "have the 'attributes of the fee, perpetuity and exclusive use and possession'." However, 
the quoted language regarding the attributes of a fee is not actually from M, K. & 7: Railway 
Co., but from Territory of New Mexico v. United States Trust Co. of New York, 172 U.S. 171, 
183, 19 S.Ct. 128, 133,43 L.Ed. 407 (1898). 
The reference to a railroad right-of-way having the attributes of "the fee, perpetuity and 
exclusive use and possession" is significant because a railroad right-of-way could either be 
owned in fee by the railroad or consist of an easement for use of the land by the railroad without 
any ownership interest. Whether the railroad company owned a right-of-way in fee depended 
upon the language Congress used to make the grant. 
As explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in Great Northern Railway Co. v. U.S., 3 15 U.S. 
262,62 S.Ct. 529, 86 L.Ed. 836 (1942), "[bleginning in 1850 Congress embarked on a policy of 
subsidizing railroad construction by lavish grants from the public domain."Id., 3 15 U.S. at 273, 
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62 S.Ct. at 533. However, after "1871 outright grants of public lands to private railroad 
companies seem to have been discontinued." Id,, 315 U.S. at 274,62 S.Ct. at 534. After 1871, 
the congressional grants of land to raiIroad companies were in the nature of an easement and not 
in fee. Id. Thus, to understand the significance of Bowman it is necessary to know the nature of 
the easement given to the railroad company. If the grant was an easement rather than a grant in 
fee, then clearly Bowman stands for the proposition that an easement can sever or subordinate 
littoral rights attached to the underlying property, thereby depriving the fee owner of the ability 
to exercise such rights. 
Bowman involved a grant made to the Lake Creek & Coeur d'Alene Railroad Company 
pursuant to an 1899 act of Congress (25 U.S.C. § 312), which statute granted railroad easements 
across "Indian" lands. Therefore, according to the U.S. supreme court in Great Northern 
Railway Co., the 1899 grant would have been an easement rather than in fee, and the railway 
company would not have had fee ownership of the ground on which the easement ran. In fact, 
25 U.S.C. 9 312 has been held to create an easement and not a fee simple interest: 
While the Supreme Court has never interpreted the 1899 Act, other courts have 
ruled that rights-of-way created under its authority constitute easements rather 
than fees. Fitzgerald v. City of Ardmore, 28 1 F.2d 717,718 (I 0th Cir. 1960); Sand 
Springs Home v. State ex rel. Department of Highways, 536 P.2d 1280,1282-84 
(Ok1.1975). This court agrees. 
Capurro v. US., 2 CI.Ct. 722,725 (CI.Ct. 1983). 
Further, even a cursory review of the case law underlying the "mere easement" statement 
in Bowman reveals that the reference has nothing to do with an easement granted to a state for 
purposes of a public highway. Rather, the only reasonable interpretation of Bowman is that its 
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holding applies to a public highway easement. 
In the Oregon Short Line case, this Court relied in part on New Mexico v. U. S. Trust Co., 
172 U. S. 171, 19 S.Ct. 128,43 L. Ed. 407 (1898), in which the U.S. supreme court discusses and 
defines the phrase "right-of-way." Review of the New Mexico decision makes abundantly clear 
that the issue confronting the courts at the time was the nature of the right-of-way granted to 
railroad companies: 
What, then, is meant by the phrase "the right of way"? A mere right of passage, 
says appellant. Per contra, appellee contends that the fee was granted, or, if not 
granted, that such a tangible and corporeal property was granted that all that was 
attached to it became part of it and partook of its exemption from taxation. 
To support its contention, appellant urges the technical meaning of the phrase 
"right of way," and claims that the primary presumption is that it was used in its 
technical sense. Undoubtedly that is the presumption, but such presumption must 
yield to an opposing context and the intention of the legislature otherwise 
indicated. Examining the statute, we find that whatever is granted is exactly 
measured as a physical thing, not as an abstract right. It is to be 200 feet wide, 
and to be carefully broadened so as to include grounds for the superstructures 
indispensable to the railroad. 
The phrase "right of way," besides, does not necessarily mean the right of passage 
merely. Obviouslv, it mav mean one thinp in a grant to a natural person for 
private uurposes, and another thing in a grant to a railroad for public puruoses, 
as different as the purposes and uses and necessities, resuectivelv, are. 
In Keener v. Railroad Co., 31 Fed. 128, Mr. Justice Brewer defined the words 
"right of way" as follows: "The term 'right of way' has a twofold significance. It 
sometimes is used to mean the mere intangible right to cross, - a right of crossing, 
a right of way. It is often used to otherwise indicate that strip which the railroad 
company appropriates for its use, and upon which it builds its roadbed. 
Washburn in his work on Easements, on page 10, says: 'Whether the thing 
granted be an easement in land or the land itself may depend upon the nature and 
use of the thing granted.' To sustain this view the learned author cites Jamaica 
Pond Aqueduct Corp. v. Chandler, 9 Allen, 159. In that case the court said: 
'Whenever a grant is made of a right or easement in lands which fall within the 
class sometimes described as 'noncontinuous,'-that is, where the use of the 
premises by the grantee for the purpose designated in the deed will be only 
intermittent and occasional, and does not embrace the entire beneficial occupation 
and improvement of the land,-the reasonable interpretation is that an easement in 
the soil, and not the fee, is intended to be conveyed. Among the most prominent 
of this class of easements is a way.' An ordinary wav, o f  course. the court meant, 
one the use of  which would be noncontinuous.-onlv intermittent and 
occasional; but a wav not of  that character, whose use would be continuous. not 
occasional, and which would embrace the entire beneficial occupation and 
imurovement of  the land, might require the fee for its eniovment.-certainly 
would require more than a mere right o f  passage.' Unlike the use of  a orivate 
wav,-that is, discontinuous,-the use of  land condemned bv a railroad comoanv 
is uerpetual and continuous.' Railroad Co. v. Trimmer, 53 N. J. Law, 3, 20 Atl. 
761. 
But if it ntav not be insisted that the fee was granted, surelv more than an 
ordinarv easement was granted.-one havinp the attributes o f  the fee, oeroetui& 
and exclusive use and ~ossession; also the remedies of  the fee, and, like if ,  
coruoreal, not incorooreal, oropertv. 
New Mexico, 172 U.S. at 181-183 (emphasis added). Clearly, the use of a public right-of-way 
for a state highway is "perpetual and continuous". It cannot be seriously argued that a state 
highway right-of-way is only for intermittent use, and for a use that does not give exclusive 
possession and right of use to the state for purposes intended under the law. A right-of-way for a 
state highway is obviously more than a "mere right of passage" or "mere easement". 
An easement is defined as "the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that 
is not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner." Hughes v. Fisher, LLC, 
142 Idaho 474,480, 129 P.3d 1223, 1229 (2006) (quoting Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225,229, 
76 P.3d 969,973 (2003) (citing Abbott v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544,548,808 
P.2d 1289, 1293 (1991)). No serious argument can be made that a public highway easement 
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meets that definition. Without a doubt, a public highway is much more like a railroad easement - 
one having the attributes o f  the fee, oeruetuitv and exclusive use and possession; also the 
remedies o f  the fee, and. like it, coruoreal, not incoruoreal, property. A public highway is not a 
"mere right of passage" or a "mere easement," as this Court has made abundantly clear: 
The permissive use of public highways, which the legislature by I.C. $5 62-701 
and 62-705 accords to utilities, is in recognition of the time honored rule existing 
in this state, that streets and highways belong to the public and are held by the 
governmental bodies and political subdivisions of the state in trust for use by the 
public, and that only a permissive right to their use, and no permanent property 
right, can be gained by those using them. Keyser v. City of Boise, 30 Idaho 440, 
165 P. 1121, L.R.A.l917F, 1004;Yellow Cab Taxi Service v. City of Twin Falls, 
68 ldaho 145, 190 P.2d 681;Boise City v. Sinsel, 72 Idaho 329, 241 P.2d 173. 
This Court in Village of Lapwai V. Alligier, 78 Idaho 124,299 P.2d 475, held this 
rule applicable to a water utility in the placing of its facilities in and upon the 
public streets of a village. 
In the exercise of its powers and duties with respect to the state highway system 
including streets designated a part thereof, the Department of Highways acts as 
agent of the state. In discharging a mandatory duty imposed by the state, such 
department performs a governmental function, LC. 99 40-106 and 40-1 11; Boise 
Development Co. v. Boise City, 30 Idaho 675, 167 P. 1032;Youmans v. Thomton, 
31 Idaho 10, 13, 168 P. 1141; within the police power reserved by this state, 
Sandpoint Water & Light Co. v. City of Sandpoint, 31 Idaho 498, 173 P. 972, 
L.R.A. 1918F, 1106;Yellow Cab Taxi Service v. City of Twin Falls, 68 Idaho 
145, 190 P.2d 681. 
State a re]. Rich v. Idaho Power Co., 81 Idaho 487, 498, 346 P.2d 596, 601 (1959). As 
discussed above, not even the fee owner of the land underlying a public highway has the right to 
encroach on the highway easement. Burns v. Kelly, 89 Idaho at 146,403 P.2d at 570. 
Plainly, Bowman and the underlying case law support the decision of the IDL that the 
public right-of-way severed or subordinated the right of Keenan and Lake CDA to wharf out. A 
public highway right-of-way is, without question, no "mere right-of-way" or, in other words, no 
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"mere easement." A public highway right-of-way is obviously inconsistent with the general use 
of the property by the owner. Use of a public highway right-of-way cannot in any way be 
considered noncontinuous, intermittent or occasional. In short, as with a railroad easement, a 
public highway right-of-way "is a base, qualified, or limited fee and is more than a mere 
easement, giving the exclusive possession and right of use of the land for the purposes 
contemplated by the law ..." Bowman, 38 Idaho a t ,  219 P. at 1064. Applying the holding of 
Bowman to the case at bar is entirely appropriate and compels the conclusion that the easement 
purchased by the state in 1940 severed or subordinated the right of Keenan and Lake CDA to 
wharf out into Lake Coeur d'Alene by building a dock attached to the public right-of-way. 
One hundred and thirty-three years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against a 
landowner in a case similar to the one at bar. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324,1876 WL 19612, 
24 L.Ed. 224 (1876). In Barney, the plaintiff owned in fee simple two lots bordering the 
Mississippi River in the city of Keokuk, Illinois. The city held an easement for a public highway 
across the plaintiff's property, which easement ran along the edge of the high water mark of the 
Mississippi River. Over the years, the city had deposited earth and stone on the waterward side 
of the easement, thereby extending the land approximately two hundred and fifty feet out into the 
river. With the permission of the city, several structures, including a packet depot, had been built 
by various enterprises on the landfill. The plaintiff landowner filed an action for ejectment, 
claiming that the riparian rights and landfill were owned by him based on the fact that he owned 
the lots up to the water's edge. Relying largely on Haight v. City ofKeokuk, 4 Iowa 199 (Iowa 
1857), the trial court held that the use of the land created by fill by the city did not interfere with 
the riparian landowner's rights. 
On appeal, the U.S. supreme court agreed with the trial court "that the dedication of the 
streets of Keokuk was a dedication at common law, and not under the statute; and that, in making 
this dedication, the original proprietors of the tract reserved the title to the soil in the street, 
particularly in Water Street; and that this title went with the several lots fronting on the street, 
and extended to the Mississippi River." Barney v. Keokuk 94 U.S. at 32.5. The court understood 
that title to the ground underlying the dedicated street remained with the landowner, but noted 
that a "street bordering on the river, as this did, according to the plan of the town adopted by the 
decree of partition, must be regarded as intended to be used for the purposes of access to the 
river, and the usual accommodations of navigation in such a connection." Barney v. Keokuk, 94 
U.S. at 340. 
Further, "as to the rights of thepublic in a city street, we cannot see any material 
difference in principle with regard to the extent of those rights, whether the fee is in the public 
or in the adjacent land-owner, or in some thirdperson." Id (emphasis added). For that reason, 
the court upheld the determination that the packet depot, used in conjunction with the wharf and 
levee for navigational purposes, was a "public use of the river bank, which is absolutely 
necessary to the use of the river as a navigable water." Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. at 342. As 
summarized by the court, the "erection of levees, wharves, and other accommodations on the 
very ground appropriated to such purposes by the original plot of the town, or, stronger still, on 
ground made and reclaimed from the bed of the river adjoining the street thus appropriated, and 
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in enlargement thereof, is clearly within the powers of the city authorities as laid down in the 
cases referred to." Id 
A number of other cases have also held that where a public street parallels or ends at a 
navigable body of water, the public right to use the street, to include the right to wharf out, 
supersedes the right of any property owner to exercise littoral rights. In those decisions, the 
court has stated either that ownership of the land underlying the public easement would not 
impact the court's decision, or that the public had only an easement rather than an ownership 
interest in the land. See, Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 31 U.S. 498, 513, 8 L.Ed. 477 (1832) ("If 
Water street be bounded by the river on the south, it is only limited by the public right. To 
contend that between this boundary and the public right, a private and hostile right could exist, 
would not only be unreasonable, but against law."); City ofTarpon Springs v. Smith, 88 So. 613, 
621 (Fla. 1921) ("Wherever the street, Anclote Boulevard, as delineated by line and stated width, 
touches or approximately touches the body of the Anclote river, the riparian rights that are 
appropriate to a street easement were also impliedly dedicated as an incident; there being no 
express or implied reservation by the dedicator of such riparian rights."); Brickell v. Town of Ft. 
Lauderdale, 75 So. 68 1,685 (Fla. 191 8) ("Where a dedication to the public use is made of a 
street or roadway, and the same is used by the public, it is the duty of the city, as trustee of the 
public rights in and to the streets within whose corporate Iimits they are, to maintain the public 
uses against encroachments".) Backus v. City of Detroit, 13 N.W. 380,382 (Mich. 1882) ("The 
common-law dedication would be sufficient to stop the owner from setting up any claim, or 
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asserting any right to the prejudice of the easement-[cites omitted]-and this is all that is important 
here."). 
The district court's reliance on West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 511 P.2d 1326 (1973) is 
misplaced. A reasonable reading of Wesf plainly reveals that it has no direct bearing on the legal 
issues that were in front of the district court in the case at bar. The effect of a highway easement 
on the fee holder's (or dockowner's) right to encroach on the county road easement was not at 
issue in West. As this Court stated twice in Smith, its decision therein did not purport to resolve 
the rights of the public in its highway easement. West, 95 Idaho at 556, 511 P.2d at 1332 
("Therefore, we must examine the question of whether the Smiths have acquired a prescriptive 
right to maintain the houseboat in its present location, keeping in mind that our decision can 
have no effect on the rights of the state or the county with regard to the location of the 
houseboat.") (emphasis added); West, 95 Idaho at 558,511 P.2d at 1334 ("As mentioned, supra, 
this decision can have no effect on the rights of the state and the county with regard to the 
location of the houseboat.'y (emphasis added). 
West, like many of the cases cited by the district court in support of its decision, is a 
dispute between private parties, and therefore has little application to the instant case. For 
example, Thies v. Howland, 380 N.W.2d 463 (Mich. 1986) involved a dispute between private 
parties and what was essentially a private easement, not a public right-of-way. Ace Equipment 
Sales v. Buccino, 869 A.2 626 (Conn. 2005) involved private parties and a non-navigable pond, 
the bed of which was owned by one of the parties to the lawsuit. Mianus Really Co., Inc. v. 
Greenway, 193 A.2d 7 13 (Conn. 1963) involved private parties, non-navigable water and no 
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public easement. Knight v. Ciarlone, 200 N.Y.S.2d 805 (N.Y 1959) was a suit between private 
parties disputing ownership of land to the low water mark, an issue that bears no relationship to 
western water law and state ownership of lakebeds to the high water mark. Musgrove v. Cicco, 
71 A.2d 495 (N.H. 1950) also involved private parties and no public easement. Mayer v. 
Grueber, 138 N.W.2d 197 (Wis. 1965) was a dispute between private parties, one of which had 
ownership interests in the lake at issue. Veach v. Culp, 599 P.2d 526 (1979) involved private 
parties, one of which ran a tourist business on what was essentially an abandoned railroad track. 
The railroad easement ran across the plaintiffs property, cutting the plaintiff off from the 
beachfront property the plaintiff owned. Because of the highly intermittent use of the railroad 
easement, the court held that the entity that owned the railroad easement could not prevent the 
plaintiff from crossing the easement to get to the beach. 
Some cases cited by the district court did involve some type of governmental entities, but 
still did not support the district court's decision. Gregg Neck Yacht Club, h c .  v. County 
Commissioners of Kent Counly, 769 A.2d 982 (Md.App. 2001) stands for the proposition that a 
dedication of a public street created an easement with riparian rights, but since the local 
government did not accept the dedication, it did not obtain the riparian rights. Murphy Slough 
Assoc. v. Avila, 104 Cal.Rptr. 136 (Cal. 1972) involved an easement granted to the U.S. Bureau 
of Reclamation for reclamation purposes and did not involve a question of the ownership of 
riparian or littoral rights. Nevins v. Friedauer, 184 N.Y.S. 894 (N.Y. 1920) involved the city of 
New York as a defendant. The plaintiff owned property along a bay, and the city had allowed 
without complaint the U.S. government to fill in the bay in front of the plaintiffs property. An 
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easement for a street crossed the plaintiffs property at an undisclosed location, and the court 
simply commented that the street could not prevent the plaintiff from gaining access to the 
waters of the bay. The issue of whether littoral rights were severed by an easement along the 
water's edge was not addressed, and it is not even clear whether the plaintiff was awarded 
ownership of the filled bay. 
Idaho case law appears to make rather clear the fact that an easement granted to the state 
for a public highway can sever or subordinate the littoral rights of a property owner, for at least 
as long as the public easement exists. An easement for a public highway can in no way be 
considered a "mere easement", something akin to a property owner being allowed to walk or 
drive across a neighbor's property to access a lake. A highway, even more than a railroad, is 
inconsistent with the use of the property by the owner on a continuing basis. The decision of the 
district court is simply wrong on this issue and should be reversed. 
2. The fill placed by the state in Lake Coeur d'Alene to build the highway 
right-of-way does not provide a basis for Keenan and Lake CDA to wharf 
out. 
The ITD has not, and does not now, contest the ownership by Keenan and Lake CDA of 
the property underlying the easement granted by the Smiths to the state in 1940, except for that 
portion of the easement that included the Lake Coeur d' Alene lakebed for the reason that the 
lakebed did not belong to the Smiths in the first place. Such ownership by Keenan and Lake 
CDA is of no significance as to whether ITD has control over the right-of-way and whether it 
prevents both landowners from building their proposed docks without a permit from the ITD. 
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For the same reason, whether Keenan and Lake CDA own the fill placed by the state into 
Lake Coeur d'Alene to build the highway right-of-way is of no significance. The ITD still 
controls the easement and the easement still severs the littoral rights attached to the properties. 
To the extent the district court relied on the ownership of the fill in reversing the agency 
decision, the district court was wrong. 
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the issue of the ownership of the fill was 
not litigated in front of the agency or the district court. The district court raised the issue sua 
sponte, and in doing so exceeded its authority under I.C. 9 67-5279. Moreover, the issue of 
ownership of property is resolved by a quiet title action, not by an administrative petition before 
the IDL. Rural Kootenai Organization, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners, 133 Idaho 833,841, 
993 P.2d 596, 604 (2000). The district court lacked jurisdiction to decide who owns the fill 
placed in Lake Coeur d'Alene by the state. 
Further, the fill was placed on property owned by the state of Idaho, not by Keenan or 
Lake CDA. The state owns the lakehed and holds it in trust for the citizens of Idaho. Kootenai 
Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 622,671 P.2d 1085 
(1983). Keenan and Lake CDA could not extend their property by placing fill in the lake, and 
the state has not conveyed any property to them by placing the fill in the lake to build the right- 
of-way. Such fill "must remain impressed with the public trust". Idaho Forest Industries, Znc. v 
Hayden Lake Watershed Improvement District, 112 Idaho 512, 521,733 P.2d 733,742 (1987) (J. 
Huntley, concurring). 
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Given that the public highway easement runs across, and in fact consists of, the fill 
placed in Lake Coeur d'Alene by the state, there is no merit in the argument that Keenan and 
Lake CDA own the fill and can therefore build a dock on it. Moreover, the issue of ownership of 
the fill was not before the agency or district court, and for that reason cannot be a basis for 
overturning the agency decision. 
D. Keenan and Lake CDA are not Entitled to Attorney Fees and Costs. 
I. The appropriate standard for attorney fees and costs is in 1.C. § 12-117. 
The district court awarded Keenan and Lake CDA $22,297.50 in attorney fees, $206.00 
in costs as a matter of right pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l)(C), I.R.C.P., and $831.00 in discretionary 
costs pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l)(D), I.R.C.P. R., p. 418. As part of the attorney fee award, the 
district court awarded $1,282.50 for work performed after the memorandum decision and order 
was entered by the district court based on a supplemental affidavit filed by counsel for Keenan 
and Lake CDA on May 8,2008. R., p. 419. 
This Court exercises free review over an award of attorney fees and costs against a state 
agency. Rincover v. Department of Finance, 132 Idaho 547, 976 P.2d 473 (1999). The proper 
standard for the grant of costs and attorney fees to a party to an appeal from an administrative 
action is set forth in LC. 5 12-1 17, which standard is whether "the party against whom the 
judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." 
In reviewing whether the ITD acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact, it is 
important to keep in mind that "the agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing 
court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations 
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are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record." Price v. Payette County Bd Of 
County Com'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998) (citing South Fork Coalition v. 
Board of Com'rs of Bonneville County, 117 Idaho 857, 860, 792 P.2d 882, 885 (1990)). 
Moreover, a "reviewing court 'shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the 
weight of the evidence on questions of fact'." Brett v. Eleventh Street Dockowner's Association, 
Inc., 141 Idaho 517,521, 112 P.3d 805,809 (2005) (citing I.C. 5 67-5279(1)). 
Significantly, even if ITD was wrong in relying on McGoldrick, such reliance was not so 
unreasonable as to require the payment of attorney fees, costs or expenses to Petitioners. Russet 
Valley Produce, Inc. v. Idaho Potato Commission, Inc., 127 Idaho 654,904 P.2d 566 (1995). In 
the case at bar, neither Keenan, Lake CDA nor the district court challenged the factual findings 
of the IDL. The district court should not have awarded fees and costs to Keenan or Lake CDA 
for the simple reason that ITD had a reasonable basis in law and fact in litigating this matter. 
2. ITD Acted with a reasonable basis in fact and law. 
a. ITD clearly had a reasonable factual basis to support its conduct. 
The IDL made the following factual conclusions, which the district court did not find to 
be in error: 
1. Close examination of the agreements and as built drawings indicate the 
subject properties have retained the littoral rights such as the right to wharf 
out in the original land grant in 1894, the five (5) acre split in 1897, the 
Agreement in 1911 and the Right-of-way deed in 1925 due to the fact the 
agreements either refer to the riparian (littoral) rights or appurtenances 
(fences) associated with the property and related to the lake. However, the 
Right-of-way Deed in 1940 contemplated filling into Lake Coeur d7Alene 
with seventy-five feet (75') on the right side of the center line (lakeward side) 
and into the lake. Further, the 1940 Right-of-way Deed only utilized 0.920 
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acres of Vera G. and Jack Smith's property, the balance of the 1.240 acres 
described in the deed is over state owned lake bed, implying significant fill 
into the lake beyond the original shoreline as it existed at statehood, July 3,- 
1890. 
2. ITD's experts believe these navigational encroachments have a high 
probability to compromise ITD's ability to maintain and repair the structural 
integrity of the "highway". The Idaho Transportation Board has the right to 
restrict encroachments on its "highways" and road prisms for the protection of 
that public highway. In accordance with IDAPA 39.03.42 ITD requires 
encroachments onto the road prism be granted permits from ITD and ITD 
does not believe it is prudent to issue permits for these navigational 
encroachments. 
3. The original shoreline is landward of the current shoreline, as is shown by the 
compilation of the historical as built drawings and the significant fill from the 
construction that took place as a result of the 1940 Right-Of Way Deed.. . 
4. ITD still maintains ownership of the "highway" and manages the "highway" 
in cooperation with the agreement with the Idaho Department of Parks and 
Recreation. 
5. Because the navigational encroachment will be placed on the "highway" and 
road prism and it is ITD's belief the navigational encroachments will 
potentially compromise the road prism and potentially limit their ability to 
maintain and repair that road prism and therefore will not authorized, or 
permit, the subject navigational encroachments. 
R., p. 31-33. 
The facts as found by the IDL leave no doubt that the docks to be built by Keenan 
and Lake CDA will encroach on a public highway easement and will interfere with the 
ability of ITD to maintain the highway right-of-way. 
b. ITD had a basis in the law to oppose the permit applications 
and defend the agency decision. 
The IDL also came to the following conclusions, which can be characterized as legal in 
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nature: 
1 .  When the fill was placed waterward of the ordinary high water mark the 
littoral right to wharf out and maintain adjacency became subordinate to the 
highway and road prism as long as ITD retains the ownership of the 
"highway" for the public and its structures such as the embankments and fill. 
2. [Tlhe littoral right became subordinate to the "highway" with the 1940 Right- 
Of-Way Deed. When that subordination occurred, the property lost those 
parts of their littoral rights which support the ability to wharf out. Without 
those littoral rights, the property was not qualified to make application 
according to IDAPA 20.03.04.020.02. 
R., p. 32-33. 
In reversing the agency decision, the district court disagreed with the legal conclusions of 
the IDL, finding that Keenan and Lake CDA had retained their right to wharf out after granting a 
highway easement to the state of Idaho. For that reason, the district court found that Keenan and 
Lake CDA had wrongfully been denied a permit to build a dock, regardless of the fact that they 
would be encroaching on a public highway easement. 
Keenan, Lake CDA and the district court have identified no authority that allows the 
landowners to build on a public right-of-way without an encroachment permit from the ITD. 
ITD, in reliance on its clearly established authority over public highway easements, had more 
than a reasonable basis to litigate this case before the IDL and defend the decision before the 
district court. 
3. The district court improperly awarded post-judgment attorney fees. 
Keenan and Lake CDA sought attorney fees for work performed after the district court 
rendered its memorandum decision and order on March 24, 2008, through the filing of a 
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supplemental affidavit from their attorney. R., p. 406. As the district court's order was a 
"judgment" pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(2), I.A.R., any claim for attorney fees had to be submitted by 
April 8, 2008, which date was the end of the requisite fourteen (14) day period following March 
24, 2008, the date the memorandum decision and order of the district court was lodged. The 
supplemental request for attorney fees was not submitted until May 6,2008. R., p. 406. 
Further, this Court has made clear that post-judgment attorney fees are not available to 
prevailing parties. Allison v. John M Biggs, Inc., 125 Idaho 567,570, 826 P.2d 916,919 (1992). 
In Allison, this Court agreed with the appellant therein that "a motion for post-judgment attorney 
fees is not allowed by any statute or rule, and cannot properly be considered a 'memorandum of 
costs' under Rule 54(d)(5), I.R.C.P." The award of post-judgment fees in the amount of 
$1,282.50 should be reversed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, as well as any that may arise during oral argument in this 
matter, the ITD respectfully requests that the decision of the district court be reversed, and the 
Final Order of the IDL be affirmed. The ITD also requests that the decision of the district court 
to grant attorney fees and costs to Keenan and Lake CDA be reversed. 
DATED this 30th day of Marc42009. 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
FNTERVENOR IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT'S BRlEF - 43 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
&A I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the= day of March, 2009, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed to the following: 
David Stanish 
Deputy Attorney General 
Natural Resources Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise. Idaho 83720-0050 
John Magnuson 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 2350 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 838 16 
Statehouse Mail d [Cl Hand Delivered 
[Cl Ovemight Mail 
[Cl Telecopy (Fax) 
6 Mail 
[Cl Hand Delivered 
Ovemight Mail 
[Cl Telecopy (Fax) 
INTERVENOR IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT'S BRIEF - 44 
